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EDITOR’S WORDS

The current issue consists of three types of articles. They respectively address and
illustrate three major concerns of comparative philosophy, as understood in a
philosophically interesting and engaging way, and thus present three major types of
coverage of the journal Comparative Philosophy.
The first type, as attended to in the first article “How is this Paper Philosophy?”
by Kristie Dotson, addresses the fundamental meta-methodological/metaphilosophical issue of how cross-tradition constructive engagement between distinct
approaches from different traditions is possible (in other words, it tackles a general
theory and methodology of comparative philosophy). Though such a concern is also
involved (more or less) in various areas of philosophy, comparative philosophy is
especially and intrinsically concerned with the issue, as discussions on the topic
explore the foundation and rationale that undergird and guide the second and third
types of explorations in comparative philosophy to be indicated below. Dotson’s
article addresses a series of principal issues concerning the identity and nature of
philosophy and its methodology; the author challenges what she calls ‘a culture of
justification’ in professional philosophy while arguing for the case of “culture of
praxis”. Though the members of our review team disagree to some of the claims
presented in the article, we render the paper philosophically interesting and engaging,
and we recommend that the voice of this paper be heard. Indeed, it is part of the
constructive-engagement emphasis and expectation of the journal that a highly
provocative but philosophically engaging paper like this is to arouse healthy
discussion in the field.
The second type addresses the issue of how distinct approaches from different
(culture/region-associated or style/orientation-associated) philosophical traditions can
learn from and constructively engage with each other to make joint contribution to a
series of issues and topics in philosophy, and all for the sake of the development of
contemporary philosophy. This is the central point of the special topic section in this
issue, “Dharmakīrti’s Buddhist Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophy”, which
includes two articles, “Dharmakīrti, Davidson, and Knowing Reality” by Lajos Brons
and “How to Avoid Solipsism While Remaining Idealist: Lessons from Berkeley and
Dharmakīrti” by Jeremy Henkel. Both articles are neither out of purely historical
interest nor merely engage in intellectual games for their own sake; rather, they are
intended to explore how a significant thinker in Buddhist philosophical tradition,
Dharmakīrti, and two important thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition,
respectively Donald Davidson in contemporary philosophy and George Berkeley of
modern philosophy, can make their joint contributions to the development of
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contemporary philosophy in such important areas as metaphysics, epistemology,
philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, etc. The contents of the articles are thus
intrinsically relevant to the philosophical interest of whoever explores the related
issues in these areas, no matter which philosophical tradition he/she focuses on.
The third type addresses the concern of how, in the setting of one cultural and
philosophical tradition, relevant resources from some other tradition(s), through their
philosophical interpretation via relevant (philosophical or other intellectual) resources
of the home tradition, can contribute to the development of contemporary society,
which includes other intellectual, professional or social areas/parts than philosophy
(as one academic discipline). Surely the philosophical enterprise as a whole is not
limited to pure theoretic explorations only but also consists of their interaction with
contemporary society (including their impact on, and their enrichment from, social
development). This is one connection in which comparative philosophy is also
especially valuable as it can play its distinct role in constructively bringing in relevant
resources and distinct visions from other traditions through philosophical
interpretation. The last article, “Benevolent Government Now” by Howard Curser,
attends to this concern through the author’s creative interpretation and application of
relevant resources from Mencius’ Confucian account in classical Chinese philosophy
to explore how his resources of benevolent government can contribute to the current
debate between American liberals and conservatives on governmental responsibilities
and duties.
Indeed, the foregoing three types of coverage of this issue, specifically speaking,
and of this journal and the constructive-engagement emphasis in comparative
philosophy, generally speaking, have been highlighted concisely in the opening
statement found on the journal’s website: this journal goes “with emphasis on the
constructive engagement of distinct approaches to philosophical issues, problems,
themes from different philosophical traditions (generally covering both culture/
region-associated and style/orientation-associated philosophical traditions), for the
sake of their joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise and the
development of contemporary society, and on general theory and methodology of
comparative philosophy.”

Bo Mou
January 2012
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HOW IS THIS PAPER PHILOSOPHY?
KRISTIE DOTSON

ABSTRACT: This paper answers a call made by Anita Allen to genuinely assess whether
the field of philosophy has the capacity to sustain the work of diverse peoples. By identifying
a pervasive culture of justification within professional philosophy, I gesture to the ways
professional philosophy is not an attractive working environment for many diverse
practitioners. As a result of the downsides of the culture of justification that pervades
professional philosophy, I advocate that the discipline of professional philosophy be cast
according to a culture of praxis. Finally, I provide a comparative exercise using Graham
Priest’s definition of philosophy and Audre Lorde’s observations of the limitations of
philosophical theorizing to show how these two disparate accounts can be understood as
philosophical engagement with a shift to a culture of praxis perspective.
Keywords: professional philosophy, diversity, culture of justification, culture of praxis,
exceptionalism, sense of incongruence, Audre Lorde, Graham Priest, Anita Allen, Gayle
Salamon

Philosophy is not for black women. That is a white man’s game.
– College Guidance Counselor at a Historically Black College (2009)
1. INTRODUCTION
My younger sister, Alexis Ford, once had the following conversation with her
Guidance Counselor, while she was a college student at a Historically Black College.
Counselor: Why don’t you major in Social Work?
Alexis: Social Work sounds good, but I am interested in philosophy.
Counselor: (Snorts) Philosophy is not for black women. That’s a white man’s game.
Alexis: My older sister is a philosophy professor.
Counselor: Well, she’s probably the only one and that should tell you something. (2009)

I remember clearly when this conversation was relayed to me. At the time, I was at
once vastly appalled and silently relieved. Appalled at the intentionally discouraging
________________________
DOTSON, KRISTIE: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State
University, USA. Email: dotsonk@msu.edu
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remarks towards my sister’s initial interests on the sole basis that she is a black
woman. And relieved because, to be honest, this initial resistance led her to seriously
reconsider a career in philosophy. At the time, I was not certain that I would
recommend a career in professional philosophy for her. In my ensuing conversations
with Alexis, it became clear to me that no matter how offensive and inappropriate the
Counselor’s words were, and they were that, I recognized an uncomfortable sense of
déjà vu. Philosophy is seen as a “white man’s game” and I am often made to feel a
sense of incongruence as a result of that impression. And though I am certainly not
the only black woman philosophy professor, as the Counselor assumed in a tongue
and cheek fashion, our numbers are still very small. According to Kathryn Gines,
fewer than 30 black women hold Ph.D.s in philosophy and also work within
philosophy departments in North America (2011, 435). If we were to count the
number of black women with research arms in black feminism, one of my primary
areas of research, with Ph.D.s in philosophy working within philosophy departments,
that number would grow starkly smaller to something like roughly 8 people. As the
Counselor suggests, these numbers do tell a story, but what?
Anita L. Allen has issued a challenge to honestly interrogate the origin of the
abysmal numbers of black women in the U.S. working in professional philosophy.
Specifically, she calls for a genuine assessment of the merits of pursuing a career in
philosophy for black women. Allen asks:
With all due respect, what does philosophy have to offer to Black women? It’s not
obvious to me that philosophy has anything special to offer Black women today. I make
this provocative claim to shift the burden to the discipline to explain why it is good
enough for us; we should be tired of always having to explain how and prove that we are
good enough for the discipline. (Yancy 1998, 172, italics in original)

Allen’s skepticism here is similar to the skepticism held in the “advice” from the
Guidance Counselor and is most likely intimately tied to my feelings of abject relief
when my sister decided to embark on a different career path. In fact, we, i.e. Allen,
the Counselor and myself, may all hold a great deal of skepticism towards the ability
of professional philosophy to offer an environment where black women can thrive,
though for very different reasons. This skepticism is not, as Allen and I are aware,
though the Counselor is most likely unaware, a doubt centered on whether black
women are good enough to do philosophy. Of course, we are. But we doubt whether
the environment provided by professional philosophy is good enough for us. As such,
Allen’s call that we scrutinize the environment of professional philosophy for its
ability to foster the success of Black women marks an important shift away from
justifications of Black philosophy, Africana philosophy, and/or black philosophers
(See Jones 1977-1978, West 1995, Outlaw and Roth 1997, Outlaw 1997) to an
interrogation into the conditions that facilitate or hinder the success of diverse
practitioners within professional philosophy as such.
Allen’s shift in focus is in line with Robert Solomon’s claim that “our critical
scrutiny today should be turned on the word ‘philosophy’ itself…to realize that what
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was once a liberating concept has today become constricted, oppressive, and
ethnocentric” (Solomon 2001, 101). Solomon, here, calls for an interrogation into
prevailing definitions of philosophy, which may work to exclude and/or suppress
diverse perspectives. Both Allen and Solomon draw attention to the possibility that
professional philosophy may provide poor conditions for diverse peoples and
perspectives. It is in honoring the call to assess the environment of professional
philosophy and the possibility of constrictive understandings of philosophy that I turn
to genuinely assess the potential of being sustained within professional philosophy as
a diverse practitioner. I understand the phrase ‘diverse practitioner of philosophy’ to
refer to notoriously under-represented populations within western, academic
philosophy. As a result, my use of ‘diversity’ here is meant to include not only racial,
ethnic, gendered, sexual, and ability diversity, but to also include diverse approaches
to philosophy, Eastern, applied, engaged, fieldwork, field, public, experimental,
literary approaches, etc. Though the specific challenges within professional
philosophy may differ among these diverse populations, the general challenges
presented by the environment of professional philosophy and constrictive definitions
of philosophy are similar.1
My cluster of concerns about the environment of professional philosophy and
constrictive definitions of philosophy can be viewed by interrogating the question,
“How is this paper philosophy?” To be clear, I am not concerned with appropriate
answers to the question, “how is this paper philosophy?” Rather, I am concerned with
the kind of disciplinary culture that renders such a question of paramount importance.
Specifically, I take the question of how this or that paper is philosophy to betray at
least one circumstance that pervades professional philosophy. It points to the
prevalence of a culture of justification. Typified in the question, “how is this paper
philosophy,” is a presumption of a set of commonly held, univocally relevant,
historical precedents that one could and should use to evaluate answers to the
question. By relying upon, a presumably, commonly held set of normative, historical
precedents, the question of how a given paper is philosophy betrays a value placed on
performances and/or narratives of legitimation. Legitimation, here, refers to practices
and processes aimed at judging whether some belief, practice, and/or process
conforms to accepted standards and patterns, i.e. justifying norms. A culture of
justification, then, on my account, takes legitimation to be the penultimate vetting
process, where legitimation is but one kind of vetting process among many.
1

It bears noting that I am not, here, focusing on the reasons why traditionally conceived diverse
peoples, e.g. racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, and ability diversity, for example, are not attracted to
philosophy as a career path. There are social, political, and class boundaries to deciding upon a career
in professional philosophy that should not be overlooked (See, for example, Allen et al. 2008, Sanchez
2011, Gracia 2000). Rather, I am specifically concerned with the environment of professional
philosophy for diverse practitioners who have made the choice to pursue philosophy as a career path.
Even still, not all people who fall under my definition of diverse practitioner will identify with the
problems I highlight. In fact, a great deal of the currently employed under-represented, traditionally
conceived diverse philosophers may be perfectly satisfied with the status quo. Unfortunately, their
numbers are small. My focus here is on interrogating the conditions that keep this number small.
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In what follows, I gesture to a dynamic that is, in part, responsible for the
relatively few numbers of diverse peoples in professional philosophy. I highlight that
the environment of professional philosophy manifests symptoms of a culture of
justification, i.e. a culture that privileges legitimation according to presumed
commonly-held, univocally relevant justifying norms, which serves to amplify
already existing practices of exceptionalism and senses of incongruence within the
profession. Ultimately, I claim that the environment of professional philosophy,
particularly in the U.S., bears symptoms of a culture of justification, which creates a
difficult working environment for many diverse practitioners. I agree with Allen’s
assessment that professional philosophy is simply not an attractive setting for many
diverse practitioners.2 As a means of addressing the downsides of the current culture
of justification within professional philosophy, I advocate for a shift in disciplinary
culture from a culture of justification to a culture of praxis.
This paper will proceed in five parts. First, I will briefly define the term, ‘culture
of justification’. Second, I identify symptoms of a culture of justification present in
the environment of professional philosophy. Third, I will outline the kind of
exceptionalism and incongruence that such a culture amplifies, which serves to create
a difficult professional culture for diverse practitioners. Fourth, I offer a beginning
step towards an understanding of philosophical engagement that can avoid the pitfalls
of a culture of justification. Specifically, I advocate for a shift from a culture of
justification to a culture of praxis. Fifth, and finally, I offer a comparative exercise
where I show how two disparate positions on philosophical engagement, i.e. Graham
Priest’s definition of philosophy as critique and Audre Lorde’s observations of the
limitations of philosophical theorizing, are both manifestations of philosophical
engagement according to an understanding of philosophy as a culture of praxis.
2. WHAT IS A CULTURE OF JUSTIFICATION?
Gayle Salamon, in her essay, “Justification and Queer Method, or Leaving
Philosophy”, identifies within professional philosophy the privileging of justification.
In fact, she cites the privilege given to justification within professional philosophy as
the catalyst for her leaving the field for English. Salamon understands the notion of
justification as “making congruent” one’s position with acceptable norms (Salamon
2009, 226). To say that philosophy has a culture of justification, then, is to say that
the profession of philosophy requires the practice of making congruent one’s own
ideas, projects and, in her case, pedagogical choices with some “traditional”
conception of philosophical engagement. For Salamon, the activity of making
congruent itself is problematic given her conception of queer method and its inherent
resistance to harmonizing with status quo conceptions. She writes:
2

Allen, of course, is not alone in holding this position. Sally Haslanger offers a similar statement in
her article, “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone).” She writes,
“Women, I believe, want a good working environment with mutual respect. And philosophy, mostly,
doesn’t offer that” (Haslanger 2008, 212).
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If justification is concerned with the ordering of beliefs, the reconciliation of one thing
with another, the making congruent of different objects or worlds, then queerness as a
method would proceed in the opposite way, by supposing a diversion or estrangement
from the norm and using that divergence as a source of proliferation and multiplication
with the aim of increasing the livability of those lives outside the norm. (Salamon 2009,
229)

Justification as a method requires we attend to prevailing norms and is antithetical,
according to Salamon, to queer methods that take estrangement from norms as a point
of departure.
A privileging of “justification as a method” refers to a heightened value placed
upon processes of legitimation, or identifying congruence between accepted patterns
and standards with one’s own belief, project, and/or processes, for the sake of positive
status. For example, taking justification as an evaluative concept, a standard,
internalist theory of justification within epistemology is analogous to Salamon’s
understanding of “justification as a method” in that it is, itself, a process of
legitimation. An internalist theory of epistemic justification, as it is generally
conceived, confers positive, epistemic status on a given belief due to whether the
given belief is reasonably held (e.g. that the belief accords with one’s evidence). In
such theories of justification, there is an element of demonstrating the congruence
between one’s belief and acceptable patterns and standards, or justifying norms, for
the sake of positive, epistemic status. Salamon aims to draw attention to a value
placed on similar forms of legitimation within the disciplinary culture of professional
philosophy as such, where one is asked to demonstrate that one’s positions, beliefs,
comportment, and/or existence is congruent with some prevailing set of norms for
philosophical engagement in order to gain positive status.3
Broadly privileging legitimation as an assessment tool for appropriate disciplinary
conduct creates a culture of justification within a given discipline. That is to say,
within a culture of justification a high value is placed on whether a given paper, for
example, includes prima facie congruence with norms of disciplinary engagement, or
justifying norms, and/or can inspire a narrative that indicates its congruence with
those norms for the sake of positive status. As such, a culture of justification will
include at least three components. It will 1) manifest a value for exercises of
legitimation, 2) assume the existence of commonly-held, justifying norms that are 3)
univocally relevant. That is to say, a disciplinary culture of justification is driven by
3

It bears noting that I see a difference between processes of legitimation and processes of validation.
Legitimation takes as a sign of positive status congruence with dominant patterns and standards, where
validation refers to evaluative processes more broadly. Validation, here, refers broadly to all processes
aimed at establishing the soundness of some belief, process, and/or practice as such. Like legitimation,
validation is an evaluative concept, but it is not confined to evaluation according to accepted patterns
and standards. In accordance with this distinction, legitimation is a kind of validation insofar as it
attempts to establish the soundness or corroborate a practice. Yet, legitimation is not the sole form of
validation available. In this paper, I see validation as referring to vetting processes in general and
legitimation as referring to a specific vetting process, i.e. justification. I will return to this distinction
later.
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the creation and/or discovery of papers and/or projects that fall within the purview of
a certain set of commonly held, univocally relevant justifying norms. Compliance
with these justifying norms, in turn, confers positive status on those papers/projects. It
is hard to deny that the environment of professional philosophy currently manifests
these three components of a culture of justification. However, if one were tempted to
deny this observation, then an interrogation of the question, “How is this paper
philosophy?” is warranted. It is through offering a descriptive analysis of this
question that the symptoms of a culture of justification can be uncovered within
professional philosophy.4
3. SYMPTOMS OF A CULTURE OF JUSTIFICATION
IN PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHY
Identifying symptoms of a culture of justification accords with identifying a 1)
manifest value placed on legitimation narratives along with a presumption of 2)
commonly-held, 3) univocally relevant justifying norms. The question of how a given
paper is philosophy is a question that calls for a justificatory account. It is, as Carlos
Sanchez might characterize, a question asking for one’s philosophical “passport”
(Sanchez 2011, 39). As such, the question aims at assessing whether one is doing
philosophy according to, presumably, commonly held, univocally relevant norms of
conduct. The pervasiveness of the question, i.e. how is this paper philosophy, betrays
a value placed on legitimation narratives.
3.1 PRIVILEGING LEGITIMATION NARRATIVES
To clarify how the question, “how is this paper philosophy,” is a symptom of a
culture of justification, I will paint a common scene in professional philosophy
contexts. Imagine or recall this scene. After I present this paper at a philosophy
conference, the question arises, as it will inevitably arise, “How is this paper
philosophy?” The question is undoubtedly a slight, whether the question-asker sees it
that way or not. It is both a charge and a challenge. The charge concerns suspicions
that the remarks offered are not, in some way, in conformity with relevant justifying
norms of philosophical engagement. This charge may find many forms depending on
the question-asker. It could manifest as a concern over whether this paper is relevant
to historical and current philosophical enterprises; or it could take the form of failing
to meet some presumed requisite abstract engagement. No matter the actual charge,
4

The symptoms of a culture of justification I will highlight do not, obviously, establish with absolute
certainty that a culture of justification exists in professional philosophy, anymore than symptoms of
anemia establish the existence of anemia. However, they do issue a call for further investigation. It is
beyond the scope of this paper, to offer a full sociological analysis of professional philosophy. Rather,
the aim of this paper is to theorize a possible catalyst for the low numbers of diverse practitioners in
philosophy and to encourage future study in this direction. To do this, I need only direct attention to
the symptoms of a culture of justification along with the possible problems such symptoms illuminate
within professional philosophy.
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the challenge remains. The challenge, then, is to “make congruent” or clarify the
connection between the remarks offered and some justifying norm of philosophical
engagement (however, it is conceived by the question-asker). What is distinctive
about the question, how is this paper philosophy, is not that my paper is not prima
facie philosophical, but rather the call for legitimation that underwrites the question.
That is to say, the answer to the question, “how is this paper philosophy,” is assessed
according to justifying norms that can confer positive status on my project and, by
doing so, show my paper to be “properly” philosophical. This call for legitimation or
justification goes beyond whether or not one can produce an adequate account of how
one’s work is philosophical, which will be contingent upon the justifying norms
deemed relevant by the question-asker. It also serves as a symptom that a culture of
justification is pervasive within professional philosophy. That is, the frequency of the
question, “how is this paper philosophy,” betrays a value placed on legitimation
narratives. This value is further evidenced by the reality that many professional
philosophers find the question, at best, unproblematic and, at worse, routinely
appropriate (For accounts that gesture to the pervasiveness of the question, “how is
this paper philosophy,” see Tiwald 2008, Outlaw and Roth 1997, Nye 1998, Sanchez
2011, Solomon 2001, Walker 2005, Prabhu 2001, Marcano 2010).
A concrete example of the value placed on legitimation narratives in professional
philosophy, a symptom of a culture of justification, can be found in Williams Jones’
article, “The Legitimacy and Necessity of Black Philosophy”. Jones identifies two
kinds of legitimation narratives. He claims that one can be asked to justify the
“adequacy and significance” of a given philosophical orientation or one can be asked
to justify a given philosophical orientation’s “right to exist as an appropriate
philosophical position” (1977-1978, 149). Diverse practitioners of philosophy are
often asked to offer both kinds of justification. There is a rich tradition of such
justifications in Africana philosophy, for example. Within an U.S. context, essays by
Williams Jones (1977-1978) to Cornell West (1977-1978) to Lucius Outlaw (1997,
1997) exemplify the fact that there are a number of existing attempts to offer
narratives of legitimation for philosophy based in the experiences and lives of
African-descended peoples. And though the necessity of engaging in narratives of
legitimation for Africana philosophy is now being challenged, the external call to
justify the existence of Africana philosophy is still strongly felt.5
3.2 COMMONLY HELD, UNIVOCALLY RELEVANT JUSTIFYING NORMS
Along with a value for narratives of legitimation, held in the question “how is this
paper philosophy” is a demand that one make clear how one’s paper is congruent with
common, univocally relevant justifying norms in order to establish the positive,
philosophical status of one’s paper. These justifying norms, which often go
5

Africana philosophy is by no means the only kind of philosophy that has been called to legitimate
itself. Jorge Gracia, for example, has leveled sustained investigative challenges to the exclusion of
Latino/Hispanic philosophers and philosophy within professional philosophy (See, for example, Gracia
2000, Gracia 2008).
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unarticulated, are thought to be accepted by all interlocutors and are presumed to be
clearly relevant to all philosophical enterprises. The environment afforded by
professional philosophy includes an ever-present demand to justify one’s
philosophical projects and engagements via presumed common, relevant justifying
norms. Recall, the presumption of 1) commonly-held, 2) univocally relevant
justifying norms are both symptoms of a culture of justification. A brief analysis of a
recent narrative of legitimation can aid in identifying this particular symptom in the
environment of professional philosophy.
Karsten Struhl’s 2010 article in Philosophical Compass, entitled “No (More)
Philosophy without Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” is a recent example of an attempt to
offer a legitimation narrative aimed at establishing the positive status of a different
kind of philosophical engagement than is typically accepted within western
professional philosophy. Struhl explains, “While this is beginning to change, it is still
generally the case that comparative philosophers find themselves on the defensive, as
they attempt to insert elements of non-western thinking into an essentially western
philosophical curriculum” (2010, 287). Finding himself on the defensive, as a
comparative philosopher, Struhl makes an attempt to put practitioners with narrow
conceptions of western professional philosophical engagement on the defensive and,
as a result, takes up the offensive position as a practitioner of comparative
philosophy. He explains, “What I am claiming [in the title] is that the philosophical
enterprise cannot adequately fulfill its purpose so long as philosophy remains
restrictive to only one tradition” (2010, 287).6 Taking philosophical engagement to be
defined by “critical and systematic investigations” of fundamental assumptions,
Struhl defends that claim that “doing” philosophy requires engagement with crosscultural philosophy for the sake of interrogating fundamental assumptions (2010,
288). Accordingly, Struhl’s article ultimately provides an account of the disciplinary
significance of comparative philosophy in terms of a, presumably, commonly held
norm for philosophical enterprises. In other words, to fulfill the promise of
philosophical enterprises, i.e. critical interrogation of our fundamental assumptions,
comparative philosophy is necessary. No matter how much this places narrow
conceptions of professional philosophy on the defensive, it is a legitimation narrative
complete with an appeal to a seemingly common justifying norm.
Though Struhl’s offensive position may shift the burden of justification away
from comparative philosophers to narrow, professional philosophers, it does so only
to the degree that the commonly held justifying norm is taken to be univocally
relevant to all philosophical enterprises. That is to say, the shift in the burden of
justification can only follow from a mutual and immediate recognition that Struhl has
indeed identified a commonly held and univocally binding justifying norm. In making
the claim that comparative philosophers are particularly well suited to philosophize in
accordance with the norm of interrogating fundamental assumptions, he issues a call
6

It bears noting that this claim mirrors William Jones’ claim in his article, “The Necessity and
Legitimacy of Black Philosophy” and the understanding of philosophical practice held in Struhl’s
article is remarkably similar to Alain Locke’s understanding of philosophy as philosophies of life (See
1977-1978, Locke 1991).
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for legitimation aimed at philosophers who would challenge the philosophical merit
of comparative philosophy given its optimal compliance with the justifying norm in
question. If the performance of Struhl’s article is to succeed at all, it does so to the
degree that the norm he identifies is actually prima facie relevant to all philosophical
enterprises. If the norm of interrogating our fundamental assumptions does not have
this kind of all-encompassing relevance, then Struhl’s attempt to put a certain class of
philosopher on the defensive is futile. One need only respond to Struhl by rejecting
the justifying norm identified. This does not figure into Struhl’s analysis because it is
often presumed by many professional philosophers that one of philosophy’s primary
roles is to systematically interrogate fundamental assumptions.
Regardless of whether Struhl has identified a genuine, commonly held, univocally
relevant justifying norm, he is certainly relying upon the existence of such norms for
the success of his account. Struhl’s account, though a very good defense of
comparative philosophy, does not challenge the call for legitimation narratives as
such. It is, rather, a good example of two symptoms of a culture of justification
present in the environment of professional philosophy, i.e. the presumption of 1)
commonly held, 2) univocally relevant justifying norms.
4. ON GRISLY GROUND: DIVERSE PRACTITIONERS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PHILOSOPHY
The environment of professional philosophy, which contains symptoms of a culture
of justification, is often rendered inhospitable for diverse practitioners due to “silent
exclusions” (Marcano 2010, 54). In a culture of justification, historical, unwarranted
exclusions come to inform the very justifying norms relied upon for legitimation.
That is, the presumption of commonly held, univocally relevant justifying norms,
when informed by unwarranted exclusions, creates means of validation incapable of
tracking those exclusions. In fact, those exclusions can easily become seen as
“reasonable” via disciplinary practice itself. In this section, I will highlight two kinds
of exclusions that are hard to track in a culture manifesting the three symptoms of a
culture of justification. They are exclusion via exceptionalism and exclusion via a
sense of incongruence. Where exclusion via a sense of incongruence is a direct result
of the fact that there are few, if any, commonly held, univocally relevant justifying
norms, exclusion via exceptionalism gestures to the point where disciplinary cultures
simply fail to accurately assess legitimation.
4.1 EXCLUSION VIA EXCEPTIONALISM
Sandra Harding offers a definition of exceptionalism in her introduction to The
Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies Reader. She writes:
Exceptionalism assumes that the West alone is capable of accurate understandings of the
regularities of nature and social relations and their underlying causal tendencies. There is
one world, and it has a single internal order. One and only one science is capable of
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understanding that order. And one and only one society is capable of producing that
science: our Western society!” (Harding 2011, 6).

Though Harding is speaking specifically of scientific explorations, the definition is
relevant here. Exceptionalism involves the unfounded, exclusion of large bodies of
investigation based upon the privileging of one group (or set of groups) and their
investigations over others. Excluded groups might actually meet many of the
demands imposed by operative, justifying norms. However, they are still excluded
due to historical privileging of investigative enterprises produced by privileged
populations.7 The exclusions of non-western philosophy in American professional
philosophy, for example, can be seen according to a kind of exceptionalism.
Non-western philosophy, as has been pointed out repeatedly, can be legitimated
according to several prevailing, justifying norms for philosophical engagement. In his
article, “Philosophy in an Age of Global Encounter,” Joseph Prabhu writes:
If philosophy consists in systematic attempts to address fundamental questions about the
nature of reality, the nature of methods of knowledge, the basis of moral aesthetic values
and judgments, the self, and the meaning and goal of religion, then there is abundant
philosophy in Indian, Chinese, and Islamic thought. (I cannot speak of African
philosophy because of my own ignorance, but I would presume that it too embodies
systematic reflection about the nature of things). (2001, 30)

After citing several productive exchanges between western philosophers and nonwestern philosophers, like the exchanges between Michael Dummett and Bimal
Matilal along with J.N. Mahanty’s fruitful engagement with the work of Gottlieb
Frege and Edmund Husserl, Prabhu concludes, “thus it cannot be on philosophical
grounds that non-western philosophy is so neglected in American universities at
present” (2001, 30). As a result, Prabhu concludes that something else is clearly
afoot. Here we see recognition of a kind of exceptionalism.
What Prabhu draws attention to is the fact that not everyone has equal access to
justifying norms in an American professional philosophy context. Exceptionalism
within professional philosophy works to not only refuse some access to justifying
norms, but to also exempt others from being subject to certain prevailing justifying
norms. For example, there are black philosophers with positions that hold marginal
anti-white sentiments that some disregarded as racist (e.g. Alexander Crummell),
while white American or European philosophers with similar anti-black sentiments
7

‘Privilege’ is a relative term. According to Peggy McIntosh, systemic privileging refers to “unearned
power conferred systematically” (McIntosh 2008, 66). Though many African Americans voices, for
example, may be privileged over many Haitian voices in terms of their ability to impact U.S. social
spheres, they are both underprivileged with respect to many White voices. In turn, wealthy White
voices are often privileged over poor White voices. The term ‘privilege’, in this analysis, refers to
broader structure of evaluation, where entire legitimation structures are tainted with the oppressive
privileging of certain social identities and social, investigative practices in the form of “unearned
power conferred systematically”. For more thorough accounts of privilege see McIntosh 2008, Bailey
1998.
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that are forgiven as products of their time (e.g. G.W.F. Hegel). Clearly there are
overarching social and political considerations that inform the decisions on who
counts as an exception to justifying norms that are not actually reflected in the
justifying norms themselves. Because exceptionalism is largely determined by social
and political structures of empowerment and disempowerment, it cannot be addressed
with adding more justifying norms. In the case of exclusion via exceptionalism,
justifying norms, themselves, are not the problems. The people applying them are the
problem. A culture of justification, or a culture that manifests the three main
symptoms of a culture of justification, has few resources for addressing the
misapplication of justifying norms. Privileging legitimation narratives and presuming
the existence of commonly-held, univocally relevant justifying norms does not assure
there is also a value placed on the appropriate use of those norms. Rather, privileging
legitimation narratives assures that most disciplinary practitioners feel as if they are
judge and jury over “appropriate” professional conduct and production, while never
recognizing the demand to acknowledge the ways prevalent social and political
structures of empowerment and disempowerment influence their judgment.8
4.2 EXCLUSION VIA A SENSE OF INCONGRUENCE
The second form of exclusion is exclusion via a sense of incongruence. Whereas
exceptionalism pertains largely to the uneven persuasive power of justifying norms,
incongruence refers to unequal acceptance of justifying norms. That is, many diverse
practitioners do not accept as valid current, dominate justifying norms within
professional philosophy. In this case, a sense of incongruence with current justifying
norms hinders one’s ability to argue for the positive philosophical status of one’s
projects. This can be seen in Gayle Salamon’s reaction to the call to legitimate her
pedagogical choice of relying upon queer theory and methods in her philosophy
classes. This call put her in the position of accepting, against her will, the norm of
justifying as such, which runs counter to her own personal, political, and theoretical
leanings (Salamon 2009). She is not alone in experiencing the sense of incongruence
she describes. Jacqueline Scott, when asked to discuss her experience as a black
woman, professional philosopher, describes the sense of not fully accepting or
fulfilling philosophical expectations. She labels this sense of incongruence,
“dissonance” (Allen et al. 2008, 185).

8

Some may say that if justifying norms are not the problem of exceptionalism per se, then what is
needed are better applications of prevailing justifying norms not, as I will argue later, an alteration of
roles assigned justifying norms altogether. It is important to understand the degree to which
exceptionalism is largely unconscious. In their respective articles, Virginia Valian and Sally Haslanger,
identify the impact of gender schemas on evaluations of philosophical performances where women are
routinely judged more harshly than their male counterparts and made subject to exceptionalism due to
being women philosophers (Valian 2005, Haslanger 2008). When one’s very judgment manifests
tendencies towards exceptionalism, this is not an easy pattern to break. It is more reasonable to foster a
climate that neutralizes such biases than to harbor hope for the elimination of those biases.
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Indeed, Salamon and Scott are not the only diverse practitioners of philosophy
who have confessed to a sense of incongruence with respect to justifying norms for
“proper” philosophical conduct and investigation. A great deal of feminist philosophy
began as a rejection of some set of justifying norms within professional philosophy.9
Still others feel a sense of incongruence with professional philosophy’s expectation of
a panoramic view and the, often misunderstood, particularity attached to “minority”
social identities. Donna-Dale Marcano, in her article, “The Difference that Difference
Makes: Black Feminism and Philosophy,” gives an account of the reality that a black
woman philosopher who takes as her point of theoretical departure the lives and
experiences of black women is often conceived as doing work so particular “that
philosophy resists its presence” (2010, 53). Marcano, of course, does not accept the
expectation that philosophical theorizing begins from the broadest possible vantage
point.10 The rejection of this justifying norm ushers in a sense of incongruence
between her philosophical projects and professional philosophical expectations, in her
estimation.
In a similar fashion, Carlos Sanchez, in his article, “Philosophy and PostImmigrant Fear,” highlights the fact that the demand for disembodied philosophizing
as a marker for what counts as philosophy is one of the ways professional philosophy
is inhospitable to “Hispanic philosophers” and “Hispanic philosophy”. He writes,
many professional philosophers believe “if a thinking situates itself, embodies itself,
or historicizes itself, then it is not profound, and worse, not philosophy” (Sanchez
2011, 40). The value of disembodied, a-historical philosophical engagement is clearly
not a value shared by either Sanchez or Marcano for converging and diverging
reasons. These are but a few examples of the myriad ways a sense of incongruence
plagues many diverse practitioners within professional philosophy. No matter its
origin, I suggest that part of what forms these senses of incongruence is a failure to
accept a justifying norm or a given set of justifying norms prevalent within
professional philosophy context.
4.3 EXCLUSION AND LEGITIMATION NARRATIVES
The presence of exceptionalism and incongruence among professional philosophers
points to the difficulty of sustaining diverse practitioners. If positive, philosophical
status follows from prima facie legitimation and adequate narratives of legitimacy,
and these, in turn, rest on dominant, justifying norms, then being barred access to
relevant justifying norms (via exceptionalism) or failing to accept justifying norm
according to which one is assessed (via incongruence) demonstrates the ways
legitimation represents an impossible goal. Without access to typical justifying
norms, the goal of justification is futile. Similarly, if one’s work reflects a rejection of
9

Take, for example, some feminist ethics rejections of “theoretical-juridical models” for moral theory
(See Jaggar 2000, Walker 1992) or some feminist epistemology rejections of neutral-subject
assumptions within theories of knowledge (See Code 1993, Code 1981).
10
She shares this orientation with other Black philosophers. See, for example, Outlaw Jr. 1996, Locke
1991, Jones 1977-1978, Outlaw Jr. and Roth 1997, Harris 1997.
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the justifying norms being used as criteria for assessment, then it seems similarly
futile to pursue legitimation. If positive, professional philosophical status rests on the
fair application of justifying norms and the uniform acceptance of those norms, then
many diverse practitioners can expect to fail adequacy tests by rote.
Some may object that the picture I have painted here is too grim. They may point
out that I have made an error in casting the justifying norms within professional
philosophy as a set of static, easily identifiable criteria. They may agree with Andrea
Nye, in her review article, “ ‘It’s Not Philosophy’,” that
Even when ratified by a version of intellectual history that covers up personal or political
sources of philosophical wisdom or that privileges science as the only source of
knowledge, philosophy’s parameters remain unstable. That the very insistence on what is
‘real’ or ‘hardcore’ philosophy against what is ‘only’ poetry, sociology, personal memoir,
or politics itself renews the possibility of yet another philosophical reconstitution” (1998,
108).

The hope here is that in a culture that manifests the three symptoms of a culture of
justification, justifying norms are continuously destabilized and revised via the very
demand for narratives of legitimation. There can be little doubt that justifying norms
for philosophical engagement change over time. In fact, it may be true, as Stan
Godlovitch argues, in his article, “What Philosophy Might be About: Some Sociophilosophical Speculations,” that philosophy is simply a discipline that is constantly
reconceptualizing its own past given shifts in socio-political climates (2000, 17).
However, one has to examine closely who has the burden of destabilizing norms at
any given time and whether this is a worthy activity for the targeted populations.
Diverse practitioners may disproportionally shoulder it. I believe the burden of
shifting the application and content of justifying norms influenced Anita Allen to
pose the question whether professional philosophy provides a good working
environment for black women. It is, I presume, part of the burden that Gayle Salamon
refused to shoulder, which made English a more desirable career choice. And it is
absolutely the burden I would never wish upon my younger sister.
The burden of shifting justifying norms within a professional environment that
manifests symptoms of a culture of justification involves sacrificing one’s labor and
energies towards providing a catalyst for change via numerous legitimating narratives
aimed at gaining positive status for oneself as a philosopher and one’s projects as
philosophical. Let me make the strong statement that shouldering this burden and the
set of experiences one exposes oneself to is not a livable option for many would-be
diverse practitioners of philosophy and the small numbers of under-represented
populations within professional philosophy attest to this observation. There are, to
speak euphemistically, better working environments for diverse practitioners, which
may not be perfect, but may certainly count as providing more opportunities for the
success of one’s own life and projects than professional philosophy. Perhaps Sally
Haslanger says it best:
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I don’t think we need to scratch our heads and wonder what on earth is going on that
keeps women [for example] out of philosophy. In my experience, it is very hard to find a
place in philosophy that isn’t actively hostile toward women and minorities, or at least
assumes that a successful philosopher should look and act like a (traditional, white) man.
And most women and minorities who are sufficiently qualified to get into graduate
school in philosophy have choices. They don’t have to put up with this mistreatment.
(Haslanger 2008, 212, italics in the original) 11

It is the realization that black women who are qualified to pursue philosophy have
other options that leads Allen to pose her challenge to assess the environment of
philosophy for the possibilities it holds for one’s own projects and quality of life.12 It
is also quite possibly why Allen states of her shift in careers from philosophy to law,
“I did not like law as much as philosophy, but I was much, much happier as a law
professor than as a philosophy professor. I hit the ground running” (2008, 172).
Hitting the ground running is unlikely for many diverse practitioners within a
professional philosophy environment where a disproportionate burden of shifting
justifying norms is placed on those very practitioners.
5. A PROPOSAL: TOWARDS A CULTURE OF PRAXIS
Problems of exceptionalism and incongruence become significant in a professional
environment that manifests the three main symptoms of a culture of justification. That
is to say, no one can absolutely control unwarranted exceptionalism, nor can (nor
should) one control the myriad senses of incongruence among diverse practitioners.
So part of making professional philosophy a more inclusive discipline will include
reducing the effect of exceptionalism and recognizing the creative capacity of senses
of incongruence. Hence, we need to work towards a disciplinary culture that not only
lessens the effect of exceptionalism, but can also create an environment where
incongruence becomes a site of creativity for ever-expanding ways of doing
professional philosophy. I propose that a step towards a more inclusive environment
within professional philosophy can start with a shift away from values held in a
culture of justification to values held in a culture of praxis. A culture of praxis might

11

Haslanger’s quote speaks not only to professional expectations (i.e. justifying norms), but also to
interpersonal dynamics (e.g. blatant sexism and/or racism). I do not specifically address interpersonal
dynamics here. In a professional environment, I understand interpersonal dynamics to be curtailed, to
the degree they can be curtailed, by the prevalent, professional culture. The existence of racism and
sexism in professional philosophy does not, by itself, explain the dismal numbers of women, racial and
ethnic minorities within professional philosophy. It is unusual, within a U.S. context, to have a
working environment free of racism and sexism. And, yet, there are still working environments more
friendly to women and people of color in the U.S., even where racism and sexism remain pervasive. In
short, poor social and interpersonal dynamics alone cannot account for the low numbers of black
women in professional philosophy. Hence, here I focus on one of the ways poor, interpersonal
dynamics are exacerbated, i.e. professional culture.
12
Certainly, this is part of the challenge Allen issued to the black women present at the 2nd Collegium
of Black Women Philosophers in 2009.
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provide a disciplinary culture that can increase livable options within professional
philosophy. A culture of praxis, I propose, has at least the following two components:
(1) Value placed on seeking issues and circumstances pertinent to our living,
where one maintains a healthy appreciation for the differing issues that will
emerge as pertinent among different populations and
(2) Recognition and encouragement of multiple canons and multiple ways of
understanding disciplinary validation.
In what follows I will develop briefly each of these components.
The idea that professional philosophy should come to place value on inquiries into
issues and circumstances present in our historical time is not a new idea. Philip
Kitcher has recently called for such a shift in his 2011 article, “Philosophy inside
Out.” In his “plea for philosophical redirection,” Kitcher aligns himself with John
Dewy in his call for the realization that contemporary philosophical investigations, at
any given time, begin with “philosophical problems [that] emerge from situations in
which people – many people, not just an elite class – find themselves” (Kitcher 2011,
250). A culture of praxis, on my account, would value investigations that contribute
to old, new, and emerging discussions, problems, and/or investigations. As Kitcher
explains, value would be placed on everything from “the state of inquiry, to the state
of a variety of social practices, and to the felt needs of individual people to make
sense of the world and their place in it” (Kitcher 2011, 254). One will no longer be
asked to justify one’s projects according to some set of justifying norms, but rather
one does need to identify a point of contribution within contemporary philosophy,
outside of contemporary philosophy, and/or in our surrounding worlds.
One can quickly object to the proposal to value contributory projects, however
they are formed, with offering the observation that this value operates as simply
another method of justification. Recall the distinction I drew between legitimation
and validation. Legitimation requires some set of justifying norms that are commonly
held and univocally relevant. Validation, on the other hand, refers more broadly to
evaluations of soundness as such. It may be difficult and unwise, to say the least, to
eliminate all forms of validation. However, legitimation is but one form of validation.
If, in a culture of praxis, validation is determined according to contribution, then it
need not be understood according to a legitimation narrative. In fact, it is entirely
possible that the call to identify one’s contribution not only contextualizes validation
in a way commonly-held, univocally relevant justifying norms does not, but also
distributes the burden of validation more evenly. Everyone’s projects must contribute.
And all projects will be seen as situated in historical questions, contemporary needs,
and/or new or emerging investigations. Wherever one turns their energies, one must
contribute.13 In a culture of praxis, justifying norms that aim to shape topics and or
13

It is important to note that “contribute” is used very broadly. It is reasonable that some professional
philosophers who might want to decipher elusive knowledge problems as contributing to a discourse
on such matters. However, it is likewise true, that philosophers concerned with race, class, gender, and
immigration issues, for example, can contribute to these discourses.
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character of all philosophical investigation no longer operate to delimit how one
contributes. This shift alone can aid in producing an environment where senses of
incongruence become the sites of new investigations, methods, and livable options, as
Salamon suggests (2009).
It is true that valuing the contribution of one’s works as part of a culture of praxis
does not move us entirely away from methods of justification. In fact, it is very likely
that a proliferation of investigations, inquiries, and questions will create a
proliferation of canonical works and criteria that will be used as justifying norms.
These norms, however, will not be generalizable in the way justifying norms appear
to be today. Also, philosophical engagement will not be determined solely by these
justifying norms. Justifying norms will become an important part of philosophical
criticism, where judgments of good and bad philosophy are made, and not judgments
concerning the philosophical nature of those endeavors. One does not call a bad short
story a collection of words, except in a tongue and check fashion, because it is a bad
short story. Accordingly, philosophy can be deemed poor philosophy without it
ceasing to be philosophy.
What the initial valuing of “live” issues and actual contribution ensures, however,
is an encouragement of multiple philosophical canons and a fragmentation of
justifying norms (including new and developing justifying norms). The philosophical
work produced and the questions asked in a culture of praxis will not always be
compatible or capable of consolidation due to the divergent inquires and experiences
that inform them. This would force recognition of the fragmentary nature of
professional philosophy, where canons and justifying norms appear more relevant in
some inquiries than others, which is very similar to how philosophical engagement
actually operates today.14 What is being proposed is, as Kitcher coins, a
“philosophical redirection” (2011), where the current activities in philosophy are
evaluated differently (See also Outlaw 1996). Again, legitimating narratives may be
introduced, but would function differently. Justification according to a supposedly
monolithic set of justifying norms would no longer be relevant. Rather, smaller,
reflexive validation mechanisms can emerge in accordance with the inquiries and
questions under investigation. An appreciation of the smaller canons that emerge
lessens the need to lay claim to some overarching set of canonical texts and or
questions in order to claim positive, professional philosophical status.
Accordingly, a culture of praxis, where projects are not predetermined and canons
are multiple, lessens the effect of exceptionalism. Let me be clear, it may not lessen
the existence of exceptionalism, but it allows for the growth of communities of
scholars to exist relatively free of the demands made by those who would practice
such exceptionalism. That is to say, relatively little time need be spent defending
14

Some may say that the inability for philosophical insights to be consolidated, speaks to how this
proposal is unrealistic. One might even attempt to make an analogy between a natural science, like
microbiology, and philosophy, stating that because a culture of praxis appears untenable for
microbiology, it should also be untenable for philosophy. This is a false analogy due to the presumed
existence of natural laws, where there is no unproblematic presumption of equivalent philosophical
laws.
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one’s project to a practitioner of philosophy who will never be convinced of the value
of one’s work. Rather, energies can be diverted toward making contributions within
one’s communities. Some may observe that this kind of focus already happens among
diverse practitioners. This is true, but it happens as part of the “periphery” of
philosophy due to a failure to gain easily recognizable, positive, philosophical status.
In a culture of praxis, the concept of periphery and mainstream would make little
sense and value will be placed on identified points of contribution. This is mainly due
to the fact that, in a culture of praxis, what creates philosophical communities is a
concern for contributions made according to one’s interests and community
involvement, rather than a shared set of justifying norms.
There are at least two objections to my proposal to move to a culture of praxis.
The first concerns a presumed inability to preserve the idea that professional
philosophy has its own distinct disciplinary specialization. The idea is just this: if
justifying norms that govern what counts as philosophy drop away, then what makes
philosophy distinctive also drops away. This objection seems to follow from the idea
that philosophy and philosophizing are not a widespread, human activity. It contains
the assumption that there is something special about philosophizing that is in the
purview of professional philosophy alone. This is a form of exceptionalism insofar as
it unacceptably rarifies professional philosophical engagement, i.e. it privileges the
output of one population over another. Let me offer an analogy to clarify this point.
There are creative writers all over the world. Most creative writers will never be able
to sustain themselves purely on creative writing, but they write nonetheless. Some of
the factors that thwart some creative writers’ hopes of fame and financial support
concern social, political and geographical privileges, differences in talent, and trends
in criticism. These factors, however, do not determine the existence or non-existence
of creative writers and creative writing. The inevitable widening of philosophical
engagement that would follow understanding such engagement according to
contribution does not lessen the activity and production of philosophy, any more than
an extraordinarily wide conception of creative writing eliminates the activity and
production of creative writing. Creative writing is still a widespread human activity;
in like fashion, philosophy is a widespread human activity.15
The second objection, gestured to earlier, concerns whether a shift to a culture of
praxis is too extreme. If the problem is, for example, poor application of justifying
norms and poor justifying norms, why not require better application of justifying
norms and better justifying norms? Within a disciplinary culture that manifests
symptoms of a culture of justification, the revision of justifying norms tends to fall
disproportionally upon diverse practitioners. This is, to be plain, unacceptable. I take
a culture of praxis to be calling for better applications of justifying norms and better
justifying norms in a way that also distributes the burden of making these changes. If
justifying norms and legitimation are difficult to eliminate as a form of validation,
15

Some identify the demise of philosophy in higher education as primarily resulting from attempting to
rarify philosophy. See, for example, Lee McIntyre’s recent opinion essay in The Chronicle Review,
entitled “Making Philosophy Matter – or Else” (2011).
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then they need to be placed in perspective. They are not always commonly held, nor
are they ever univocally relevant. A professional disciplinary culture needs to make
room for this reality. And a culture of praxis, on my account, can account for
fragmentary, diverse justifying norms by displacing all-encompassing justifying
norms for contextual assessments of contribution. In what follows, I will give an
example of how a culture of praxis can work to neutralize, to a degree,
exceptionalism and aid in creating a space where senses of incongruence can become
sites of creative philosophical engagement.
6. A COMPARATIVE EXERCISE:
TESTING THE TWO COMPONENTS IN A CULTURE OF PRAXIS
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the culture of praxis in professional
philosophy, I will briefly describe two understandings of philosophy, i.e. Graham
Priest’s definition of philosophy as critique and Audre Lorde’s observations of the
limitations of philosophical theorizing. I do this to show how both accounts can be
seen as philosophical engagement in accordance with the two components of a culture
of praxis.
6.1 GRAHAM PRIEST AND PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE
After disagreeing with Wittgensteinian and Rortian understandings of philosophy,
Graham Priest, in his 2006 article, “What is Philosophy?” offers a conception of
philosophy that he labels, “philosophy as critique” (200). On Priest’s view,
philosophy entails a negative and positive project. It is has both critical and
constructive arms. Priest writes, “Learning philosophy is not simply learning a bunch
of facts; it is learning how critically to evaluate people’s ideas” (2006, 201). Though
criticism may be said to flourish in any field, it holds a distinct place in philosophy.
“What distinguishes the role of criticism in philosophy is,” Priest writes, “precisely
that there is nothing that may not be challenged” (Priest 2006, 202). So not only is
philosophy defined by criticism, that orientation is itself “unbridled” (Priest 2006,
201). Hence, for Priest, “philosophy is precisely that intellectual inquiry in which
anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny” (2006, 202).
The critique-centered nature of philosophy serves to produce three features, on
Priest’s account. Philosophy is 1) subversive, 2) unsettling, and 3) of universal import
(Priest 2006, 202-203). Presumably, because philosophers are prepared to challenge
everyday common beliefs, philosophy is subversive. And this subversiveness is
unsettling to the new student of philosophy, according to Priest. The claim concerning
the “universal import” of philosophy, however, follows from nature and value of
criticism. Priest writes:
Philosophy is of universal import. Concerning any field of inquiry, one may ask pertinent
philosophical questions. One does this when one challenges things that the inquiry itself
takes for granted. This is exactly what the philosopher has a license to do. (2006, 203)
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Here, asking questions is synonymous with making challenges. It is the making of
challenges that shows philosophy’s universal import. There is no assumption a
philosopher cannot question and no position a philosopher cannot challenge. Priest
will go on to suggest that if the common practice of attacking positions put forward
by philosophers at professional conferences is any indication, then his interpretation
of philosophy is correct. “Criticism,” Priest adds “is the life-blood of the discipline”
(2006, 203). Philosophy, then, holds a critique-centered spirit that takes as its object
anything and everything, and, as such, is a discipline with universal import.
The critique aspect of philosophy is the negative element of philosophizing. Priest
also adds a positive element of philosophizing realizing that conceiving of philosophy
as merely combative criticism is probably not a “terribly attractive picture” (2006,
203). So he adds the observation that “philosophy is a highly constructive enterprise.
Philosophers are responsible for creating many new ideas, systems of thought,
pictures of the world and its features” (2006, 203). It becomes very apparent that
Priest holds the constructive side of philosophy, i.e. the creation of new ideas, to be
the harder and the more rewarding side of philosophy. Yet, upon a careful reading,
even the constructivist side is done for the sake of criticism. Priest explains that it is
easy to be a “knocker” or a person who only knows how to critique the positions of
others. It is an altogether more difficult endeavor to offer criticism that is supported
with a “rival theory” (Priest 2006, 204). “Criticism,” Priest explains, “is…most
powerful only when it has the backing of some rival theory” (2006, 204). The new
ideas in philosophy arise out of responses to and criticisms of old ideas. What
underwrites this understanding of philosophy and its alleged universal import is the
so-called intrinsic value of finding problems (via criticism), then finding solutions to
problems (via rival theories).
This understanding of philosophy is not unusual. It is actually rather common. It
is a definition of intellectual activity that many black feminists find less than fruitful,
however. In what follows, I will articulate Audre Lorde’s observations concerning the
limitations of this kind of theorizing, where Lorde’s tacit understanding of theorizing
is very similar to Priest’s definition of philosophy. Hence, if philosophy is understood
according to Priest’s conception of philosophy as critique, Lorde offers an account of
serious limitations for philosophical theorizing. Again, the challenge here is to show
how a culture of praxis can accommodate both Priest’s conception of philosophy and
Lorde’s observations of its limitations.
6.2. AUDRE LORDE – SURVIVAL IS NOT AN ACADEMIC SKILL
Lorde juxtaposes poetry, which is driven by experience and feelings, on her account,
with theoretical enterprises, which are driven by conceptual thinking and criticism.
She establishes that one of the values of poetry is the ability to render merely
theoretical observations relevant to actual living. Though Lorde offers an interesting
defense of the necessity of poetry in her work, what is of interest here are the
limitations she sees in philosophical theorizing that makes it a “handmaiden” to
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poetry (1984, 56). For Lorde, the limitations of philosophical theorizing concern a
commitment to the rationality-from-nowhere ideal and a commitment to the view that
the meaning of living is solving problems.
6.2.1 RATIONALITY-FROM-NOWHERE
In a 1979 interview with Adrienne Rich, Rich questions Lorde about a set of positions
she puts forth in her 1977 article, “Poetry is not a Luxury”. Lorde’s position reads,
“The white fathers told us: I think, therefore I am. The Black mother within each of
us – the poet – whispers in our dreams: I feel, therefore I can be free” (Lorde 1984,
38). Rich asks Lorde to respond to the criticism that she is, here, simply restating an
old set of stereotypes of “the rational white male and the emotional dark female”
(Lorde 1984, 100). Lorde’s response is fascinating. One would expect her to defend
herself against the charge that she is espousing the belief that only white males are
properly rational and only “dark females” are properly emotional. Instead she
responds by dissolving the critique:
I have heard that accusation, that I’m contributing to the stereotype, that I’m saying the
province of intelligence and rationality belongs to the white male. But if you’re traveling
a road that begins nowhere and ends nowhere, the ownership of the road is meaningless.
If you have no land out of which the road comes, no place that road goes to,
geographically, no goal, then the existence of that road is totally meaningless. Leaving
rationality to white men is like leaving him a piece of that road that begins nowhere and
ends nowhere. (1984, 100)

According to Lorde, there is something meaningless about the concept of Rationality.
The understanding of the human practice of exercising reason held in Rationality, for
Lorde, has no origin, no destination, and no goal. It does not have a specifiable locale
and as such it has no use. Now, is she saying that all rationality is meaningless, in
general? No, because Lorde will go onto explain:
Rationality is not unnecessary…it serves feeling. It serves to get from this place to that
place. But if you don’t honor those places, then the road is meaningless. Too often, that’s
what happens with the worship of rationality and that circular, academic, analytic
thinking. (1984, 100)

Lorde appears to challenge whether the concept of Rationality is useful given that it is
a concept of a human practice, not the practice of being rational or exercising reason.
The practice of rationality always has a location. There is a where-from and a whereto for every attempt to be rational. Honoring the place and space of given instances of
reason is what affords rationality meaning. Hence, attempts to render reason abstract,
without appeal to space and place are, on Lorde’s account, meaningless. So an
assumption of ownership over such a concept amounts to an inconsequential claim.
6.2.2 LIVING AS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED
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A way to defend the value of concepts of human practice, like Rationality, could
follow from understanding conceptual thinking as a way to address contemporary
problems. By addressing problems in the world, philosophy can help to guide human
behavior. For Lorde, this response is contingent on a certain approach to the world
and living. It conceives of living as if it presented itself as a set of problems to be
solved. Lorde, on my reading, observes limitations to this particular worldview. She
writes:
When we view our living in the european mode, only as problems to be solved, we rely
solely upon our ideas to make us free, for these were what the white fathers told us were
precious. But as we come more into touch with our own ancient and original noneuropean view of living as a situation to be experienced and interacted with, we learned
more and more to cherish our feelings, and to respect those hidden and deep sources of
our power from whence true knowledge and, therefore, lasting action comes. (Lorde
1984, 37)

Lorde, here, sees a clear connection between a particular worldview and the reliance
upon ideas. Regardless of whether her designation of “european” and “non-european”
is correct, taking living “as a problem to be solved” leads one to both believe in and
rely upon ideas in a certain way. It would behoove us to try to articulate what a
problem/solution conception of living might entail. There are at least three
commitments. The first would concern valuing the activity of discovering problems.
The second would concern placing a value on analyzing these problems in order to
determine possible solutions. And the third commitment would concern articulating
solutions to the problems. It is not clear where, according to a problem/solution
approach to living and its three commitments, one need ever act upon a solution.
Uncovering ideas alone is presumed to have revolutionary force. All that is needed to
change the world is to think of a solution. It is not clear, for Lorde, how this
orientation for living, the creation of ideas in the form of problems and/or solutions,
can ever make demands upon our actions by itself. The question here is the following:
how precisely will discovering, determining, and articulating problems and/or
solutions make demands upon our actions?
Lorde, here, seems to be suspicious of how ideas and conceptual thinking can
make demands on our actions. More precisely, because conceptual thinking can and
does make errors, the process of finding problems and solutions is infinitely
regressive. For example, the above question of ‘How will discovering, determining,
and articulating problems/solutions make demands on our actions,’ if taken as a
problem that needs to be solved, will produce answers which themselves are
problems to be solved. One can lose herself/himself in the process of finding
problems and offering solutions. Reframed in the terms of Graham Priest’s
conception of philosophy as critique outlined earlier, one can lose herself/himself in
the infinite regress of criticism and rival theories without ever acting in accordance
with a single idea. In fact, the problem/solution model, or the criticism/rival theory
model, by itself, may be a means of suspending action indefinitely. As a result, Lorde
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demonstrates that relying solely on ideas and concepts does not make demands on our
actions, but rather must be combined with some other form of human activity, i.e.
poetry, that translates theory into action (Lorde 1984, Lorde 2009). As a result, she is
not outright rejecting philosophical thinking, as she understands it, but rather
observing its limitations.
Philosophy, when taken as criticism and rival theories, is implicated by Lorde’s
observations concerning problem/solutions models. A problem/solution orientation
underwrites a criticism and rival theory conception of philosophy. In what follows, I
will not attempt to defend Graham Priest’s idea of philosophy as critique or Audre
Lorde’s proposed limitations to such an activity, though both positions, I believe, can
be defended for different reasons in very different contexts. Instead, I aim to show
how both Priest’s definition of philosophy and Lorde’s observed limitations for
philosophical theorizing can be accommodated with the two components contained in
a culture of praxis.
6.3. HOW DO THEY PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY?
Neither Priest’s, nor Lorde’s remarks offered here are original. However, I chose
Priest’s conception of philosophy as critique and Lorde’s observed limitations of
philosophical theorizing very deliberately. Neither conception is particularly easy to
reconcile with the components I identify as present within a culture of praxis. Recall,
the first component is value placed on identifying and pursuing “live” concerns
and/or questions and the second component concerns recognition of the proliferation
of canons and justifying norms. On my reading of Lorde, the emphasis on concerns
and/or questions in the first value may appear to render Lorde non-philosophical.
And, on the surface, Priest’s conception of philosophy looks largely irrelevant in this
discussion as a relic of a culture of justification.16 However, there are several features
of Priest’s and Lorde’s respective observations that make them well suited to
exemplify how a culture of praxis might work.
6.3.1 COMPONENT 1: VALUE PLACED ON CONTRIBUTING TO “LIVE”
CONCERNS
Again, the first component of a culture of praxis is a value placed on seeking issues
and circumstances pertinent to our living. Lorde, as was briefly mentioned, rejects the
orientation that living presents itself as a set of problem to be solved. As such, the
idea that philosophy is primarily composed of the identification of concerns and/or
questions to be investigated and engaged is not an orientation to which Lorde might
readily subscribe. However, it is not clear that Lorde’s desire to move away from a
problem/solution worldview renders seeking pertinent issues and circumstances
irrelevant. In fact, she explains that both philosophical theorizing and something like
16

See Dotson 2011, Moulton 1996, for accounts that observe the ways criticism within philosophy
shores up a culture of justification.
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poetry are necessary for survival (Lorde 1984, 37). However, privileging
philosophical theorizing without a medium that situates that theorizing so as to
produce viable action is futile. As such, Lorde, in observing limitations to the brute
search for problems and solutions, is offering an alternative methodology for pursuing
applicable insights. What counts as theorizing that contributes to “live” problems,
according to Lorde’s understanding of the limitations of problem/solution
philosophizing, would shift significantly. Accordingly, her conception of
philosophical writing would shift significantly. Literature, poetry, autobiography
would count as viable sources for philosophical engagement.
It is clear that what philosophy would look like, for Lorde, would be very
different than what philosophy would look like for Priest. This is primarily because
what counts as a contribution would look very differently depending upon the
methodological commitments one holds, i.e. either Lorde’s conception or Priest’s
conception. This observation alone would not render Lorde’s approach lacking in
positive, philosophical status. Such an assessment would be irrelevant. 17 In this case,
we can see how a culture of praxis can aid in proliferating the kinds of methodologies
one relies upon and the texts included in one’s canon. In other words, Lorde’s work
can increase the livable options for philosophical practitioners within professional
philosophy, if it is not made to answer to, let us say, the justifying norms that follow
from Priest’s account of philosophy as critique.
Priest’s account is far easier to reconcile with the value of seeking “live”
questions. Priest, at no point in his article, specifies a single body of relevant
questions. In fact, for Priest there is nothing that cannot be questioned. Hence, the
creation of a singular body of appropriate problems and/or questions seems to be
antithetical to his approach. And even if some should feel the need to construct a set
of “appropriately” philosophical questions, that list could be questioned. Along with
the emphasis on questioning, in Priest’s account, one need only emphasize the fact
that Priest’s conception of philosophy holds a negative and a positive component,
where the positive component may be extended to whether one contributes to some
discourse and/or ongoing circumstance.
6.3.2 COMPONENT 2: MULTIPLE CANONS, MULTIPLE METHODOLOGIES
OF DISCIPLINARY VALIDATION

17

In this vein, however, other factors will still hold sway over which philosophical praxes will thrive
within a given philosophy department. Yet, given the reality that at this moment in history,
professional philosophy is being called to highlight its usefulness, it might behoove otherwise
recalcitrant professional philosophers and philosophy departments to reevaluate the scope and role of
philosophy (McIntyre 2011). For example, in a culture of praxis, graduate education in philosophy can
be broadened to allow more room for the creation of philosophers with expertise in other fields of
study relatively easily. Not all professional philosophers would be employed in philosophy
departments, which is an already present reality for many professional philosophers. But the stigma
that can follow not being employed in a philosophy department for professional philosophers might be
significantly lessened.
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The second aspect of a culture of praxis involves the proliferation of canons and
methods of disciplinary validation. On this front, Priest’s definition of philosophy as
criticism also does not require a single set of canonical writings. In fact, a multitude
of questions will probably produce a multitude of canons. Now, where his position
might appear irreconcilable to the second component of a culture of praxis is whether
Priest is committed to a single method of disciplinary validation, i.e. discernable
critique. This is where the culture of praxis idea might appear to be incompatible with
Priest’s conception of philosophy. Answers to the question, “what is philosophy,” like
Priest’s definition, imply a delimiting perspective on disciplinary engagement.
However, this is only an implication. It actually becomes a delimiting perspective if
we take Priest to be offering a universalizable definition of philosophy, i.e. critique as
a univocally relevant justifying norm. That is to say, within a culture of justification
that admits of one set of justifying norms, Priest’s account of philosophy as critique
could easily become a constrictive definition of philosophy. However, in like fashion,
the understanding of philosophical theorizing that follows from Lorde’s observations,
if taken to contain the only set of justifying norms available, would be equally
constrictive. A culture of justification and its assumption of commonly held,
univocally relevant justifying norms makes any understanding of philosophical
engagement constrictive. Within a culture of praxis, however, Priest’s definition is
not universalizable. As a result, in a culture of praxis, Priest’s account can be probed
for the ways it is at once useful for some projects and irrelevant to others.
This second component of a culture of praxis is not a feature of philosophical
theories themselves, unlike the first component. It is a component that should
manifest in disciplinary environments for professional philosophy themselves. For
example, Priest’s understanding of philosophy as critique and the methodological
validations that follow from it may prove irrelevant to positions following from a
philosophical praxis based on Lorde’s positions. But this does not spell disaster for
Priest’s understanding of philosophy; it simply gives us a sense where it, quite
possibly, does not apply. That is to say, valuing multiple forms of disciplinary
validation acts like a check against the universalizability of definitions of philosophy
and their resulting justifying norms, which too often translates into constrictive and,
at times, ethnocentric definitions of philosophy along with justifying norms that are
falsely taken to be commonly held and univocally relevant. A proliferation of
disciplinary validations, that map onto how one’s work contributes (including
methodologies that shape one’s contribution and one’s definition of contribution),
would go far to create an environment where senses of incongruence become sites of
exploration. A culture of praxis, with its value on contribution, multiple canons, and
multiple forms of disciplinary validation, would be flexible enough to identify
philosophical engagement according to a range of factors. As a result, a culture of
praxis within professional philosophy would present a great deal more livable options
than it does currently.
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DHARMAKĪRTI, DAVIDSON, AND KNOWING REALITY
LAJOS L. BRONS

ABSTRACT: If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former
being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’
independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the
relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with
their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern
defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction
between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most
rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this
fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their
noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his
theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of
words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and
shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but
ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on the noumenal-phenomenal
relationship turn out to be complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative
reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism.
Keywords: Dharmakīrti, Donald Davidson, apoha, triangulation, reality, meta-ontology,
subjectivity, metaphysical dualism

1. INTRODUCTION
What can we know about reality? If two communicating beings are both aware of a
certain black queen chess piece as evidenced by their reference(s) to that black queen
chess piece in their communication, does that imply that there ‘really’ is (something
that is) that black queen chess piece? At least there must be something causing the
shared awareness. If we call that ‘something’ a noumenal cause and the shared
conceptualized awareness of the black chess queen a phenomenal appearance, then
the question could be rephrased as being about the (possibility, necessity, and/or
extent of) identity or non-identity between such phenomenal appearances and their
________________________
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noumenal causes, or between our phenomenal beliefs and noumenal reality. The
extremes on the gamut of answers to this (kind of) question would be (a variety of)
metaphysical dualism arguing for non-identity of causes and phenomena, and thus for
the illusoriness of our phenomenal beliefs; and (a variety of) non-dualism identifying
phenomena with their causes and rejecting (the possibility of) massive error of our
beliefs.
The rejection of metaphysical dualism and the subjectivity it implies is a central
theme in the philosophy of Donald Davidson, but his anti-dualism is rarely phrased in
terms like those employed above. According to Davidson:
What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the fact that we
must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects of a belief to
be the causes of that belief. And what we, as interpreters, must take them to be is what
they in fact are. Communication begins where causes converge: your utterance means
what mine does if belief in its truth is systematically caused by the same events and
objects. (1983, 151)

On the other end of the gamut, Dharmakīrti and many other Indian (and Tibetan)
Buddhist philosophers argued for the non-identity of conventional (phenomenal)
reality (saṃvṛtisat) and ultimate (noumenal) reality (paramārthasat), and considered
the former to be (in some sense) illusory.
Nevertheless, despite that seemingly fundamental difference, there are remarkable
similarities between Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s ideas about the connection(s)
between words and phenomena on the one hand, and the (noumenal) world on the
other. Both defended a form of externalism about the content of words or concepts
that is both social and physical. That is, the content of words or concepts is
determined in a process involving at least two communicating beings (the social
aspect), and a shared noumenal stimulus (the physical aspect). In Dharmakīrti’s
thought, this idea is part of the theory of apoha; in Davidson’s later thought
(especially that of the 1990s), it is called ‘triangulation’.
Apoha and triangulation are (a.o.) theories about what makes it possible that
words can (come to) be used to refer to ‘things’. If those theories are valid, actually
having concepts, actually communicating, implies that those necessary conditions
(that ‘what makes it possible that ...’) must be actually satisfied as well. In Davidson’s
words: “successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true,
view of the world” (1977, 201). Reading apoha and triangulation in this way, the
focus shifts from the prerequisites of language and communication to meta-ontology,
from phenomenal effects to their noumenal causes, from the observation of the
existence of language and communication to Dharmakīrti’s dualism and Davidson’s
non-dualism.
Metaphysical dualism, in its strongest form, denies any access to the noumenal
world, and thus robs metaphysics of its subject matter – such dualism leads to a kind
of ontological deflationism. A radical non-dualism, on the other hand, gives direct
access to noumena through language, reducing metaphysics to little more than an
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analysis of ordinary language and the findings of physics (e.g. Manley 2009). The
debate between ontological deflationism and inflationary (mainstream analytical)
metaphysics is the main battlefield of meta-ontology (sometimes called ‘metametaphysics’; see Chalmers et al. (2009) for a recent overview). If Dharmakīrti and
Davidson have similar theories leading to apparently contradictory meta-ontological
conclusions (dualism vs. non-dualism), then an analysis and comparison of those
theories, and – if possible – an attempt to integrate them, may be a valuable
contribution to this debate.
Not surprisingly, given the distance in time, space, and tradition between
Dharmakīrti (7th century, India, Buddhist philosophy) and Davidson (20th century,
USA, analytic philosophy), the similarities between their arguments are hidden
behind vastly different terminologies, aims, and background assumptions. The
combination of similar arguments and (seemingly) contradictory conclusions,
however, justifies an attempt to decontextualize, translate, and integrate these theories
for the twin purpose of (1) determining the essential difference between apoha and
triangulation that causes these two seemingly similar theories about word - world
connections to be associated with contradictory meta-ontological perspectives (dualist
vs. non-dualist); and (2) analyzing and – if possible – transcending that difference in
order to assess the meta-ontological implications of communication. The aim of this
paper, therefore, is not just to compare Dharmakīrti and Davidson, but to bring them
– or at least (an interpretation of) some of their ideas – together, to integrate and
extend. In other words, it aims at ‘constructive engagement’ (Mou 2010) more than at
the juxtaposition (or even opposition) inherent in ‘comparison’. And to some extent,
given the vast differences in theoretical and traditional backgrounds, such integration
or constructive engagement requires deviation from both – the ‘middle path’ between
Dharmakīrti and Davidson leads to an answer that is neither dualist, nor non-dualist
(and neither strictly Dharmakīrtian nor Davidsonian).
Whatever the intended conclusion of an argument on the identity or non-identity
of phenomenal appearances and noumenal causes, these two ‘levels of reality’ must
be distinguished (if even as a purely semantic distinction for the sake of rejection).
Therefore, before turning to apoha and triangulation, section 2 explores these ‘levels’
– and what is in between – in Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s thought. Section 3
briefly introduces Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha as concept formation and more
extensively explains the notion(s) of ‘triangulation’ and the role(s) it play(s) in
Davidson’s philosophy, and section 4 argues that apoha in the more restricted sense
of ‘negative classification’ is the aforementioned ‘essential difference’ causing the
different meta-ontological position, and outlines a variant of triangulation that
incorporates such (apoha-ic) negative classification: an apoha-triangulation
integration. The role of negative classification is further analyzed in section 5 in terms
of the boundaries of types and tokens, which is illustrated by Dharmakīrtian and
Davidsonian answers to the question about the black queen chess piece – “no” and
“yes” respectively. Section 6 finally, argues that these different answers are really
answers to different questions and are, therefore, complementary more than
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contradictory; and discusses the consequences of the apoha-triangulation integration
presented in section 4.
2. THE NOUMENAL, THE PHENOMENAL, AND THE IN-BETWEEN
Metaphysical dualism is the distinction and opposition of a noumenal and
phenomenal (level of) reality, the idea that the world as it appears to us may be (or
even is) nothing like the world as it ‘really’ is independent of our experience. In
Western philosophy, Kant’s distinction between appearances and things-inthemselves, or between phenomena and noumena, is the paradigm of metaphysical
dualism, but Kant scholars disagree about the metaphysical status of the opposites –
whether Kant’s noumenal - phenomenal dialectic is an opposition of ‘worlds’ or
‘aspects’. Similarly, the distinction in general can be framed alternatively in terms of
‘two realities’, ‘two worlds’, ‘two levels of reality’, ‘two aspects of reality’, and so
forth. However, unless (or until) these terms are clearly defined, any one of them
could be a metaphor for any of the others; and any one of them is equally
metaphorical (and ambiguous) in itself.
Setting aside metaphors and Kantian connotations, ‘phenomena’ or ‘phenomenal
appearances’ will be interpreted here as referring to the things, stuffs, events, and so
forth as we consciously and conceptually experience them, and the ‘phenomenal
world’, ‘phenomenal reality’, or the ‘phenomenal level of reality’ as the world of
phenomena, the world or reality as it appears to us (as conscious observers of and
participants in that world/reality). Hence, phenomenal experience is conscious,
conceptualized experience, experience of cows as cows, water as water, and
weddings as weddings. These two predicates, ‘conscious’ and ‘conceptualized’ are
not independent – neither Dharmakīrti, nor Davidson allows for conscious, nonconceptual experience for reasons to be explained below.1 However, there may be
room for the converse, for some kind of un- or semi-conscious conceptual experience,
although this would be mostly a derivate of conscious experience with little relevance
for the subject matter of this paper.2
The ‘noumenal world’, ‘noumenal reality’ or the ‘noumenal level of reality’ is the
world or reality independent of our experience (or of how we experience it). There
are not necessarily ‘noumena’ as counterparts of phenomena, however. It can be
argued that phenomena have ‘noumenal causes’ (and perhaps coincide with (or are)
those if non-dualism is correct), but it is not necessarily the case that there are
1

By way of advance summary: Dharmakīrti distinguishes conceptualized (‘determinate’) phenomenal
experience (pratibhāsa-pratīti) from non-conceptual and non-conscious raw sensory data (pratibhāsa),
with external (‘ultimate’/noumenal) reality as the only other category. Hence, ‘conceptual’ and
‘conscious’ come together. Davidson famously rejected ‘non-conceptual content’, i.e. something nonconceptual in the conscious mind (see below in this section), and argued that thought requires concepts
(see next section).
2
The existence of such (derivative) unconscious but conceptual experience and thought is supporter by
research in cognitive neuroscience on non- (or un-) conscious processes. (e.g. Hassin et al. 2005;
Tamietto & de Gelder 2010)
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discrete, individuated noumena as the count noun character of that term suggests. A
further asymmetry between the noumenal and the phenomenal is that while the
phenomenal world (or phenomenal reality) is the sum total of phenomena, the
noumenal world (or noumenal reality) includes the sum total of ‘noumenal causes’,
but there may also be a part of noumenal reality without phenomenal effect(s) or
counterpart(s).
Metaphysical non-dualism then, can be roughly defined as the idea that in normal
circumstances3 phenomena necessarily are (identical with) their noumenal causes –
‘things’ as they appear to us are the (noumenally) real things(-in-themselves), and
therefore, (phenomenal) appearances are non-deceptive. Metaphysical dualism, on the
other hand, rejects the necessary identity of phenomena and noumena and argues
either for possible or actual difference. Consequently, according to dualism, ‘things’
as they appear to us are or may be nothing like things-in-themselves, and therefore,
(phenomenal) appearances are (actually or potentially) deceptive (or illusory).
The distinction between metaphysical dualism and non-dualism hinges on
‘identity’ (and its opposite, ‘difference’), which is a rather ambiguous notion here. A
theory claiming complete qualitative identity could be easily qualified as non-dualist,
and another theory claiming significant qualitative and numerical difference (in which
‘significant difference’ means something like ‘below any reasonable threshold of
fuzzy identity’) would be dualist, but a theory claiming numerical identity and
qualitative non-identity would be harder to classify, and it is not difficult to imagine
further cases that seem to fall somewhere in between dualism and non-dualism.
Rather than as a dichotomy, the distinction between metaphysical dualism and nondualism could be perceived as a scale of some kind with intermediate positions
between extremes. Resolving the issue of (non-) dualism – if possible – then, would
not be a choice between these extremes, but an assessment of the extent to which
phenomena and their noumenal causes can be meaningfully said to be (non-)
identical.
Questions like this, and theories and debates about noumena and phenomena and
(the) relationship(s) between them in general, are more commonly framed in terms of
‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’. Depending on which interpretation or definition of these
terms one adheres to, the crux of the realism - anti-realism polarity is either the
existence of, or the possibility of making truth-apt statements about noumenal reality.
The focal point here, however, is neither existence, nor describability, but identity or
non-identity of noumena and phenomena, which is much more accurately captured in
the terms ‘dualism’ and ‘non-dualism’ than in variants or extensions of ‘realism’ and
‘anti-realism’. Moreover, neither Davidson nor Dharmakīrti (at least in the context of
3

The clause ‘in normal circumstances’ is needed to exclude hallucinations and other extraordinary
situations in which some experiencer (temporarily or not) experiences things that are not ‘real’.
However, defining such ‘normal circumstances’ (and/or the contrary) without reducing the definition
of non-dualism to ‘phenomena are noumena except when they are not’ may not be easy, and
consequently, this clause is a serious weakness, but because presenting and defending a theory of nondualism is not the purpose of this paper, as a characterization of the general idea this rough definition
should suffice.
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his epistemological writings) can be classified unambiguously and uncontroversially
as either a realist or a non-realist (except perhaps, after another redefinition of those
terms). (Davidson rejects both realism and anti-realism in (1998b), for example.)
There have been attempts to recruit them for either camp, but both have also been
interpreted (more appropriately) as somehow transcending the realism - anti-realism
opposition. Dharmakīrti’s and Davison’s approximate positions on a dualism - nondualism scale, on the other hand, are reasonably easy to determine – the former
explicitly adheres to dualism, while the latter equally explicitly rejects it.
Nevertheless, although there should be little doubt that Dharmakīrti is closer to the
dualist end of the scale and Davidson closer to the non-dualist end, because of the
aforementioned ambiguity of ‘identity’ and its opposite in this context, and because
of interpretive ambiguities, it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to pinpoint the
exact position of either Dharmakīrti or Davidson.
One of the defining characteristics of Buddhist philosophy is a form of
epistemological dualism, a distinction between conventional (or phenomenal) truth
(saṃvṛti) and ultimate truth (paramārtha). Knowledge beyond the mere conventional
or phenomenal (hence, beyond saṃvṛti), knowledge of ultimate truth, is (a
requirement for) liberation (from suffering), and consequently, in Buddhist
philosophy, epistemology is soteriology. Ultimate truth was often conceived as truth
about (a.o.) the nature of the relationship between noumena and phenomena, but
theories about that relationship differed between schools – some considered ultimate
truth to be that phenomena and noumena are identical, while others argued for
metaphysical dualism. The most rigorously developed version of such dualism can be
found in the epistemological writings of the Yogācāra ‘logicians’ Dignāga (5-6th ct.)
and (especially) his indirect student Dharmakīrti (7th ct.).
Like many other Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakīrti distinguished two ‘realities’
(or two levels of reality), ultimate reality (paramārthasat) and conventional reality
(saṃvṛtisat) (e.g. Dunne 2004). Ultimate reality is the noumenal world, or the
noumenal level of reality, and is composed of svalakṣaṇa, unique spatio-temporally
non-extended part-less noumenal ‘atoms’; conventional reality is the phenomenal
world, or the phenomenal level of reality, the world as it appears to us. These two
realities (or levels of reality) are connected through perception (pratyakṣa) and
conceptual construction (kalpana). The connection is indirect, however. Central idea
in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s epistemology is the distinction of and relationship
between two kinds (or levels) of ‘appearance’ – indeterminate and determinate
appearance (pratibhāsa and pratibhāsa-pratīti)4. “In the former we directly grasp
4

Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabinduprakaraṇa. – There are a number of different terms used for the distinction
between determinate and indeterminate appearance, and as is the case with many Sanskrit
philosophical terms, these are translated differently by different interpreters. ‘Pratibhāsa’ is an
abstraction of ‘pratibhā’, which most literally means ‘reflection’, but which in a philosophical context
more commonly meant ‘thought’, ‘appearance’, ‘mental image’ or something similar. A pratibhā is an
‘appearance’ in the sense of something appearing in, to, or before the mind. Furthermore, in the
conceptual opposition with ‘pratibhāsa-pratīti’, pratibhāsa is not-pratīti. ‘Pratīti’ means ‘approach’,
‘apprehension’, ‘distinction’, ‘conviction’, or ‘belief’ (or something similar) and has a Vedic
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particulars, while in the latter we directly grasp mentally constructed universals, but
thereby indirectly grasp particulars” (Siderits 2004, 371). The notion of
‘determination’ (pratīti) separating these two kinds (or levels) of appearance refers to
verbal determination or conceptual construction (kalpana). Indeterminate appearance
is the result of direct perception (pratyakṣa), which was defined by Dignāga as “free
from conceptual construction / nonconceptual” (kalpanāpoḍha) (Pramāṇasamuccaya
1.3c); and determinate appearance is (conscious) phenomenal perception – perception
of something as something. In other words, determinate appearance is phenomenal
appearance (or phenomenal experience), and indeterminate appearance is a prephenomenal intermediary between the noumenal world and our phenomenal
experience.
Davidson famously argued against (certain kinds of) such intermediaries in “On
the very idea of a conceptual scheme” (1974) and “The myth of the subjective”
(1988a). He opposed what he called the ‘third dogma of empiricism’, the idea that
there is “an element in the mind untouched by conceptual interpretation” (1988a, 40),
“an ultimate source of evidence the character of which can be wholly specified
without reference to what it is evidence for” (p. 42), and the related idea that our
‘conceptual schemes’ somehow ‘organize’ this ‘element’ or ‘fit’ this ‘source of
evidence’ (1974). His primary target was the empiricist notion of ‘sense data’ (and
the subjectivity it implies), and these short quotes summarize his main objections
against that notion. The first objection is closely related to Sellars’s (1956) argument
against ‘the myth of the given’, the idea that there are givens in the mind independent
of, and prior to, conceptualization. The second objection takes issue with the
disconnection of phenomenal experience from its noumenal causes.
This latter objection is related to a more general rejection of metaphysical
dualism, a recurrent theme throughout many of Davidson’s philosophical writings.
According to Davidson, “words and thoughts (...) are necessarily about the sorts of
objects and events that commonly cause them” (1988a, 45). It is the distal stimulus,
the (noumenally) real world object or event, that determines the content of words and
thoughts, not the proximal stimulus of sense data (see also section 3). More than in
the arguments against sense data and subjectivity, this anti-dualism finds clear and
explicit expression in Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of ‘massive error’. In a
number of papers (e.g. 1977; 1982a; 1983), he argued that communication (or
interpretation) is only possible if communicators have (shared) largely true beliefs
about the world; and since we are able to communicate (often quite successfully), our
phenomenal experience cannot be completely false (in ‘massive error’; i.e. different
from noumenal reality) (see also the two quotes in the introduction of this paper). In
the course of the 1990s, many of these arguments would be integrated within the
‘triangulation’ framework that will be the topic of most of the next sextion (see also
Malpas 2009; 2011b).
connotation of self-evident clearness. In this context, ‘pratīti’ refers to the determinateness of some
pratibhā, to their appareance as something. ‘Pratibhāsa-pratīti’ then, is determinate appearance, and in
contrast, ‘pratibhāsa’ is indeterminate (or perhaps pre-determinate) appearance.
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The same non/anti-dualism lays at the foundation of Davidson’s argument(s)
against sense data, subjectivity, and conceptual schemes. In the aforementioned two
papers, Davidson concluded that “the idea that there is a basic division between
uninterpreted experience and an organizing conceptual scheme is a deep mistake,
born of the essentially incoherent picture of the mind as a passive but critical
spectator of an inner show” (1988a, 52); and “in giving up the dualism of scheme and
world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the
familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false” (1974,
198). Nevertheless, Davidson’s rejection of metaphysical dualism does not imply a
rejection of the conceptual distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal (as
defined in this paper) itself, although he did not use those (or related) terms. This is
evident, for example, in his philosophy of mind, ‘anomalous monism’, which depends
on a distinction between noumenal events and their phenomenal descriptions (e.g.
1970; 1993).
At first glance, there seems to be a fundamental disagreement here between
Davidson (and Sellars) on the one hand, and Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga) on the other.
However, whether the refutation of (given) sense data is also a refutation of
pratibhāsa (indeterminate, pre-phenomenal appearance) depends on whether the
latter is (a kind or variety of) the former. And whether Davidson’s criticism of
conceptual schemes also applies to kalpana (conceptual construction) depends
primarily on whether the source material of kalpana is the same as (or essentially
similar to) that what is ‘organized’ or ‘fitted’ in Davidson’s interpretation of
conceptual schemes, hence again, to whether pratibhāsa is (given) sense data.
Davidson and Sellars object to (given) sense data as some kind of non-conceptual
mental content. In its epistemic role (as ‘evidence’) that mental content must have
propositional form. It must consist of identifiable, more or less discrete, and
determinably (inter-) related chunks of sensory information that map (almost) directly
to concepts. For words (or ‘concepts’) to ‘fit the evidence’ of sense data, that
evidence must consist of such (interrelated) sense data chunks. As the source material
of the ‘organizing’ role of conceptual schemes (in Davidson’s reconstruction thereof),
sense data is similarly structured. Davidson’s interpretation of the metaphor of
‘organization’ is really re-organization – conceptual schemes re-organize what is
already in some sense organized (i.e. structured in discrete chunks of sensory
information) (1974, 192ff). Hence, ‘non-conceptual’ is a bit of a misnomer here
because, although such sense data is non-verbal (or better: not-yet-verbal), it is not
entirely non-categorized (but note that the categorization is (supposed to be) provided
by noumenal reality, not by a categorizing agent). Davidson and Sellars’s
interpretation of sense data is better described as propositional, non-verbal mental
content, as something in the mind that has propositional form, but (still) lacks
verbalization. Such sense data should be distinguished from ‘sensory experience’
(1988a, 45), the pre-mental, uninterpreted signal of the sense organs, which is nonpropositional (in addition to being non-verbal), which is more before than in the
mind, and which is causally, but not epistemically, related to conceptual(ized) beliefs
(in the mind). Davidson rejects sense data, but not such ‘sensory experience’ (his
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term)5 (but he does consider the latter without philosophical significance). “Of cause
there are causal intermediaries. What we must guard against are epistemic
intermediaries” (Davidson 1983, 144).
In Nyāya epistemology, the main philosophical opponent of Buddhism in
Dharmakīrti’s time, perception is a two stage process involving bare, undifferentiated
(nirvikalpaka) perception, followed by perceptual judgment resulting in differentiated
(savikalpaka), but still non-verbal perception; and conceptualization is nothing but
the attachment of linguistic labels to the propositional content resulting from that
second stage of perception. In other words, the Nyāya theory of perception involved a
notion of propositional, non-verbal mental content, hence (given) sense data. It was
exactly that notion that Dharmakīrti rejected (in Nyāya epistemology). According to
Dharmakīrti, “perception is necessarily non-propositional” and “limited to a bare
sensing which does not directly produce any useable information” (Dreyfus 1996,
213).
Pratibhāsa (indeterminate, pre-phenomenal appearance) is not (given) sense data.
Like Davidson’s ‘sensory experience’, it is pre-mental and uninterpreted, and causally
rather than epistemically related to phenomenal experience.6 There is a further
similarity between the two concepts in their ‘innocence’: Davidson argued that the
form and nature of ‘sensory experience’ (as it is produced by particular sense organs)
is mere empirical accidence without philosophical significance (1988a, 45); and
Dharmakīrti added the predicate ‘free of error’ (abhrānta) to Dignāga’s definition of
pratibhāsa as non-conceptual.
In other words, despite the fundamental difference with regards to the (non-)
identity of noumena and phenomena, there appears to be a lot of agreement between
Davidson and Dharmakīrti – both argue for a causal (rather than epistemological)
connection between the noumenal and phenomenal levels of reality through an
innocent intermediary (pratibhāsa or ‘sensory experience’). Moreover there are
striking similarities in their respective theories on the noumenal - phenomenal
connection, which is the subject matter of the next section.
3. APOHA AND TRIANGULATION
In Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s philosophical system(s), phenomenal experience and
conceptual knowledge are connected (through perception) to ultimate (noumenal)
reality by means of apoha. This concept of ‘apoha’ plays a role in two different but
related theoretical contexts – conceptual construction (kalpana) and concept
formation. In the former we construct particular determinate phenomena in opposition
5

Davidson’s term for this innocent intermediary, ‘sensory experience’ is not a particularly good term
because the word ‘experience’ suggests something in the mind, perhaps even something conscious, and
something pre-conceptual in the (conscious) mind is exactly what Davidson objected to, and which is
exactly what ‘sensory experience’ is not.
6
Because of the epistemological purpose of Dharmakīrti’s theory, his rejection of an epistemic
intermediary lead to theoretical difficulties that kept many generations of (especially Tibetan)
Scholastics occupied (see Dreyfus 1996), but that is of no concern to us here.
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to what they are not; we perceive a particular cow as not non-cow; in the latter we
create (pseudo-) universals rather than particular determinations (phenomena).
Dignāga introduced the concept in the former context. Conceptual construction
(kalpana) is a form of inference (Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.1) which works by means of
exclusion: apoha (id. 5.17). The closest Western equivalent to this idea is Derrida’s
concept of ‘différance’, which similarly expresses a deferring of meaning (or
determination) by reference to or embedding in a network of different, but related,
concepts. Dharmakīrti further elaborated Dignāga’s idea (and philosophy in general)
and applied it to concept formation (mostly in the auto-commentary to his
Pramāṇavārttika; Dreyfus 1997; 2011; Tillemans 2011). Making Dharmakīrti’s ideas
“clearer than they are”(p. 278), Dreyfus summarizes apoha as concept formation as
follows:
[O]ur starting point is our experience of things and their mutual resemblances. These
experiences give rise to a diffuse concept of similarity. To account for this sense of
similarity, we construct a more precise concept by correlating conceptual representations
with a single term or sign previously encountered. This creates a more precise concept in
which the representations are made to stand for a commonality that the objects are
assumed to possess. (...) In this way experiences give rise to mental representations,
which are transformed into concepts by association with a linguistic sign. The formation
of a concept consists of the assumption that mental representations stand for an agreed-on
imagined commonality. Two points must be emphasized here regarding concept
formation. First a concept, which is nothing but an assumption of the existence of a
fictional commonality projected onto things, comes to be through the conjunction of two
factors: the experience of real objects and the social process of language acquisition. (...)
Second, a concept is mistaken. (Dreyfus 1997, 227)

Further summarizing Dreyfus’s summary: concepts are formed in communication
about shared experiences of real things. Hence, apoha is (or involves) a kind of social
and physical externalism about language. In (recent) Western philosophy, externalism
about language and/or mental content is usually either social, as in Kripkenstein’s or
Burge’s externalism, or physical, as in Putnam’s, but rarely both. The most important
exception is Davidson, particularly his theory of triangulation, which has much in
common with apoha. Dreyfus (2011) writes that according to apoha “thought and
language are causally related to our experiences of things and hence are grounded in
reality” (p. 209), but the exact same could be written about triangulation. Compare
also the first half of the above quote with Davidson’s assertion that “all creatures
classify objects and aspects of the world in the sense that they treat some stimuli as
more alike than others. The criterion of such classifying activity is similarity of
response” (1991, 212). And compare the above quote’s conclusion with the central
idea of triangulation: concepts (and therefore the possibility of communication and
thought) depend “on the fact that two or more creatures are responding, more or less
simultaneously, to input from a shared world, and from each other” (1997a, 83).
Davidson first introduced the notion of triangulation in the second last paragraph
of “Rational animals” (1982b) in the context of an argument for the necessity of
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objectivity for thought. “Our sense of objectivity is the consequence” of a kind of
triangulation involving two creatures, each of which “interacts with an object, but
what gives each the concept of the way things are objectively is the base line formed
between the creatures by language” (p. 105). During the 1990s, Davidson employed
the notion in a variety of related contexts, and consequently, triangulation became
gradually associated with more and more parts of his philosophical system (see also
Amoretti & Preyer 2011a; Malpas 2009; 2011b).7 Partially because of that,
“Davidson’s triangulation figure is notoriously difficult to explicate” (Fergestad &
Ramberg 2011, p.221), and different interpreters understand the notion (sometimes
subtly) differently and position it differently in the wider context of Davidson’s
philosophy (or even ignore that wider context, as Malpas (2011a) points out). For
example, Føllesdal (1999) suggests that the term was introduced “for the process of
language learning” (p. 724), specifically for the role of perception in word learning;
Sosa (2003) associates it with the principle of charity and radical interpretation in the
context of the refutation of skepticism about external reality (hence, in the context of
metaphysical anti-dualism); Carpenter (2003) interpretes triangulation as a model of
language learning and as such as the ‘transcendental argument’ for externalism about
mental content at the very core of Davidson’s philosophical system; Lepore and
Ludwig (2005) locate it in the context of the ‘third person perspective’ and
Davidson’s arguments for the necessity of language for thought; and Glüer (2006)
disentangles the two aspects of triangulation suggested in Davidson (1997b): “without
the triangle, there are two aspects of thought for which we cannot account. These two
aspects are the objectivity of thought and the empirical contents of thoughts about the
external world” (p. 129). All of these interpretations (and probably a few more that
are not mentioned here) are correct; the apparent differences are merely the result of
differences in focus on particular aspects of the notion’s application.
“In its simplest form” or “its pure state” (e.g. Davidson 1999, 731), triangulation
is a singular occasion of pointing out some object by one communicant to another by
means of some ad hoc sign. These two communicating creatures and the shared
stimulus are the three corners in the triangle. Many of Davidson’s papers make use of
a notion of triangulation in a less ‘simple’ or ‘pure’ form, however: as (a model of) a
process of word learning by means of repeated similar signs in the (repeated)
presence of similar stimuli (e.g. 1990a; 1992; 1994; 1997c; 1998). In the second half
of the 1990s, the notion of ostensive learning appeared as a variant denotation of such
triangulatory word learning (my term) (e.g. 1997c; 1998), and in that form, the idea
made its final appearance in the last pages of the posthumously published Truth and
Predication (2005a).8
7

In (1990a), discussing externalism, Davidson wrote that “for some thirty years [he had] been insisting
that the contents of our earliest learned and most basic sentences (…) must be determined by what it is
in the world that causes us to hold them true” (p. 200); in other words, that the basic idea of
triangulation had already been a central part of his philosophy for some thirty years at that point.
8
In (2001a), Davidson wrote that (the importance of) ostensive learning was his original inspiration for
the idea of triangulation. Consequently, the later references to ‘ostensive learning’ are a return to the
source of triangulation more than a substantial change or innovation.
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figure 1: Davidson’s triangle
U

I
S

O

Either in its ‘simple’ or in its less simple form, triangulation involves the same
triangle graphically represented in figure 1. It should be immediately obvious that the
term ‘triangle’ is a misnomer if triangles are considered to consist of nothing but three
corners and three sides – triangulation involves a fourth element: language (S in
figure 1), which Davidson called the ‘base line’ on a number of occasions, but which
is more properly characterized as the triangle’s pivot. These four elements are
connected by six lines as shown in the figure and explained in the following. A
communicating creature U utters (wavy line) some sound S (which could in principle
also be another kind of sign) in reference9 (double line) to some object, occurrence, or
state of affairs O perceived (single line) by U. Triangulation further involves a second
creature I that also perceives (single lines) the object (etc.) O, the sound S, and its
utterer U, and the relationships between these three (uttering: U-S, reference9: S-O,
perception: U-O; but note that the awareness of these relationships is not graphically
represented in the figure). By ‘correlating’ these incoming lines, I finds or creates the
meaning (or ‘content’) of S. Words (as a kind of sign S; but not necessarily all words)
are learned by repetition of this process (often with different people in the roles of U
and I at different occasions, and/or the same people switching roles): by repeated
correlation of sufficiently similar verbal signs S, sufficiently similar objects O, and
sufficiently similar utterers U (that belong to the same species and seem to speak a
similar language, for example).10
Triangulation explains how (it is possible that) words get (empirical) content or
meaning. Triangulation “is necessary if there is to be any answer at all to the question
what [a creature’s] concepts are concepts of” (1992, 119); without triangulation,
words could not have content, and (therefore) (propositional) thought would be
9

‘Reference’ here, is nothing but the act (by the utterer) of referring to something; it should not be
confused with the technical term.
10
The repetition of such correlations is essential. Malpas (2011b) correctly points out that there is a
“need for triangulation to operate through repetition” (p. 259). This, however, seems to be ignored by
some (perhaps even many) critics of triangulation (see Amoretti & Preyer 2011a for an overview). The
common criticism that triangulation does not fix a connection between a word and a noumenal kind
seems to be based on (a) the assumption that according to Davidson, such a connection can be made in
a single triangulatory event (rather than in repeated triangulations), and (b) the neglect of Davidson’s
holism and coherentism. The latter fits in with a general tendency observed by Malpas (2011a) to
ignore these and other less orthodox aspects of Davidson’s (especially later) philosophy. See further
section 4.
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impossible (1982b; 1991; 1997b). The question how (it is possible that) words get
meaning (or content) should be distinguished, however, from the questions what
‘meaning’ is and how to determine (a) meaning, although neither these questions, nor
their answers are always easily kept apart. For example, Davidson’s answer to the last
of these questions is his theory of interpretation (radical interpretation (1973) in
cases with the least information to start with) but interpretation (of meaning) is based
on the same triangle: interpreter I determines the meaning of S by correlating the
‘incoming lines’.11 As his closing statement in a paper rejecting Quine’s dependency
on proximal stimuli (see also section 2), Davidson writes: “the active role of the
interpreter (...) requires that the interpreter correlate his own responses and those of
the speaker by reference to the mutually salient causes in the world of which they
speak” (1990b, 62). The terminology here seems to be that of interpretation, but the
idea expressed is that of triangulation: speaker, interpreter, mutually salient cause (the
distal stimulus): these are the three corners (U, I, O) of the triangle. The apparent
incongruity is partially explained by the strong similarities between the two ideas
(interpretation and triangulation), which differ more in background and purpose than
in process or effect; and partially by the fact that, aside from the singular mention of
‘triangulation’ in (1982b), it was only around this time that Davidson started to apply
the term in a wider range of contexts.
Davidson answered the third question, what meaning is, by analyzing meaning in
terms of truth (e.g. 1967; 2005a) – ‘s means in L that p’ is equivalent to ‘s is true-in-L
iff p’ where s is some statement, L is a language, and p is a description of the truth
condition of s in the meta-language. If S in figure 1 would be a simple constative
rather than a word – ‘ame ga futte iru’ (‘it is raining’ in Japanese), for example – then
the meaning of S in the language spoken by U is that, if S is true, then O, which is
described in the meta-language (English in this case) as ‘it is raining’. By defining
‘meaning’ in this way, Davidson avoided an ontological commitment to facts as
thruth-makers and meanings as abstract entities. ‘Meaning’ in itself is of little
relevance in the context of this paper, however; what concerns us here is the
implication of the possibility of meaning something – not so much that S is true iff O,
but that without O (along with some other conditions), there could not be an S.
Perhaps confusingly, Davidson sometimes seems to coalesce the questions what
meaning is and what makes meaning possible; that is, ‘meaning’ is sometimes
understood in terms of triangulatory word learning history, rather than in terms of
truth, particularly in the context of metaphysical anti-dualism. Two speakers “may
mean different things by the same words because of differences in the external
situations in which the words were learned”, and therefore, “the correct interpretation
of what a speaker means is not determined solely by what is in the head; it depends
also on the natural history of what is in the head” (1988a, 44). Which leads to the
conclusion that “in the simplest and most basic cases, words and sentences derive
their meaning from the objects and circumstances in whose presence they were
11

On the relation between triangulation and (radical) interpretation, see also Carpenter (2003),
Goldberg (2011), and Malpas (2011b).
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learned” (p. 44), in other words, that meaning depends on triangulatory word learning
history; and consequently, “words and thoughts (...) are necessarily about the sorts of
objects and events that commonly cause them” (p. 45), and thus not subjective (or
illusory).
Although this argument predates Davidson’s explicit usage of the term
‘triangulation’ in the context of word learning (1990a; 1992; 1994; see also above and
footnote 7), and the term, therefore, does not occur in the paper, the idea that “words
and sentences derive their meaning from the objects and circumstances in whose
presence they were learned” is the same idea elaborated in the word learning version
of triangulation, thus connecting Davidson’s arguments against subjectivity or
metaphysical dualism with triangulation. His (1988a) argument also connects
triangulation and anti-dualism with the ‘primacy of the idiolect’, the idea that ‘a
language’ is a collection of idiolects (1986; 1994), which also applies to truthconditional meaning (see above) – the L in ‘true-in-L’ is an idiolect, and ‘true-in-L’ is
‘true-in-the-idolect-of-U’ (U is the utterer in figure 1), where ‘idiolect’ is, moreover,
continuously changing under the influence of new triangulatory experiences (thus:
‘true-in-the-idolect-of-U-at-t).
Aside from the somewhat indirect connection between triangulation and metaphysical anti-dualism through (meaning as) triangulatory word learning history, there
are two more direct connections.12 The first of these can be found in (1983) and
(1990a): Davidson’s argument against ‘skepticism of the senses’ (i.e. metaphysical
dualism) in (1983) quoted in the introduction of this paper (“What stands in the way
of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the fact that we must, in the plainest
and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects of a belief to be the causes of
that belief.”; p. 151), is quoted by Davidson himself in (1990a) in the context of
externalism about mental content, i.e. the origination of the content of words and
thought – through triangulation – in external reality. The second of these more direct
connections was already hinted at above: the stimulus in triangulation (O in figure 1)
is shared (e.g. 1991; 1997a), and a shared stimulus can only be a distal stimulus.
Using the term ‘interpretation’ rather than ‘triangulation’, Davidson pointed this out
in (1990b), as mentioned above, but the argument of that paper partially overlaps with
that of (1997a), which explicitly mentions “the triangular nexus of causal relations”
(p. 83). There cannot be language, communication, and thought without triangulation,
and there can be no triangulation without (shared) distal stimuli (along with the other
necessary conditions) – we speak and think, therefore our words are grounded in
distal stimuli (i.e. in the noumenal world).
4. TRIANGULATING DIFFERENCE
Triangulation as word learning and apoha as concept formation, while similar in their
world - word connection through social learning processes, differ in two respects.
12

On the connections between triangulation, (radical) interpretation, anti-dualism, and externalism
about mental content, see also Carpenter (2003), Sosa (2003), and Malpas (2011b).
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First, and least importantly, the idea and implications of triangulation are much more
extensively, and more rigourously explored than apoha, which is partly due to the
theories’ embeddedness in different philosophical traditions, and partly to the
obscurity of many of the key philosophical texts on apoha. The second, more
important difference is expressed in the characterizations as word learning and
concept formation respectively – triangulation merely names (or assigns words to) the
objects and occurrences given by the noumenal world (in a sense, Davidson relocates
the ‘given’ from sense data to noumenal reality), while apoha simultaneously
constructs and names phenomena. Assuming that conceptual construction is always
and necessarily construction out of sense data, Davidson rejected construction with
the rejection of sense data (see section 2). That rejection may have been premature,
however. Conceptual construction (kalpana) by means of apoha in its more narrow
sense as anya-apoha, (classification by) exclusion of what is different, does not
depend on sense data or similar epistemic intermediaries, and is therefore, at least in
that respect, not inconsistent with triangulation. And incorporating apoha in
triangulation – that is, adapting triangulation to allow for construction by exclusion,
or extending a more rigorous reconstruction of apoha with an exploration of
consequences as in triangulation – does neither lead to metaphysical dualism, nor to
anti-dualism, as the final sections of this paper will show. Furthermore, similaritybased (positive) classification of experiences is considered a weakness of Davidson’s
theory of triangulation by some critics (e.g. Fennel 2000; Ludwig 2011), and
therefore, the substitution of (negative) classification by exclusion may lead to a
stronger version of triangulation; a version that would, moreover, be tied in more
closely with Davidson’s holism.
Consider the following very abstract example: a perceiver has become aware of 9
particulars, which all have one and only one characteristic such that these
characteristics are values on a single dimension, and each particular has a unique
value on that dimension. figure 2 shows the positions of the 9 particulars on that
single dimension (the x-axis, ranging from 0 to 1). (An example of such a dimension
could be (the noumenal ground or cause of) the range from dark (0) to light (1).) The
perceiver perceives the difference between the 9 particulars, but at the same time
notices that some are less different (or more similar) than others. The pair {d,e} is
considerably less different than {c,h}, for example.
figure 2
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Next, assume a second perceiver who, in the presence of e (and nothing but e)
utters ‘def’, and does so again in the presence of d (and nothing but d), but utters
‘bac’ in the presence of b (and nothing but b). With this information alone (the
utterings and the perceived relative differences), the first perceiver is able to construct
two working concepts, ‘bac’ and ‘def’, such that the first refers to {a,b,c}, and the
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second to {d,...,i}. Further communication may refine these concepts – despite the
gap between c and d, it is in principle possible that c is classified as ‘def’ rather than
‘bac’, for example; and there may be a third concept ‘hig’ that refers to {g,h,i} and
that restricts ‘def’ to {d,e,f}. (Note that there are many more possible classifications
of the particulars in figure 2, including various discontinuous ones.)
Let us assume that further triangulations result in the latter restriction of ‘def’
indeed. The formation of this concept makes those particulars seem even more
similar, even identical in their ‘def’-instantiating capacity, but that is mere
phenomenal illusion. Having a concept ‘def’ does not mean that the apparently
similar elements of {d,e,f} are ‘def’, that they share a property ‘def’-ness, that such a
universal ‘def’-ness exists, or that defs (ultimately/noumenally) exist (as defs). All
that the ‘things’ we call call ‘def’, the phenomenal defs, share is that they are ‘not
non-def’.
This ‘not non-...’ is the key notion in anya-apoha (exclusion of difference). It
should not be interpreted as a double classical negation ‘not not’, but available
sources do not make clear how ‘not non’ should be understood exactly either. Siderits
(e.g. 1991) proposed an interpretation based on Matilal’s (1971) distinction between
‘nominally’ and ‘verbally bound negation’ found in Hindu philosophy, but as Siderits
admits himself (2011), there is no clear evidence for that distinction in Buddhist
philosophy (and it is, moreover, not immediately clear how Siderits’s two kinds of
negation relate to ‘exclusion’ and ‘difference’). Nevertheless, the idea that ‘not non’
should be interpreted as two different negation-like operations is not implausible,
provided that it can be made to work such that it coheres with the basic idea of
excluding what is different (anya-apoha), while not collapsing into identity (as is the
case with a double classical negation).
The point of the formula ‘x is not non-X’ is avoiding the ontological commitment
to an universal involved in ‘x is (an) X’. X marks a class, membership of which is
determined by an universal, meaning or intension, or something similar; and ‘x is X’
denotes membership of that class (xX), which implies that there is an X (that the
universal X (or X-ness) exists). Any acceptable interpretation of ‘not non-...’,
therefore should (a) not collapse into xX, and (b) not commit to the existence of X
(or other universals or classes determined thereby) by existentially quantifying over X
(etc.). Three interpretations will be briefly outlined here, but the first two violate
either (a) or (b) and are, therefore, rejected. In all three, it is assumed that ‘not’ stands
for classical negation, and that it is, therefore, the ‘non’ operation that needs
elucidation.
(1) ‘Non-X’ is the absolute complement of X (XC=def.U\X) and ‘x is non-X’
means xXC (x is an element of the absolute complement of X; that is, it belongs to
the class of ‘things’ that are not X). ‘Not’ as classical negation merely negates , and
therefore, ‘x is not non-X’ means xXC (x is not in (or is excluded from) the class of
things that are different from X). However, this interpretation (obviously) fails
because xXCxX, collapsing the two negations in ‘x is not non-X’ into ‘x is X’,
thus violating (a). Nevertheless, the implicit identification of ‘not’ with ‘exclusion’
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and ‘non’ with ‘difference’ in anya-apoha (exclusion of what is different) seems
correct.
(2) Rather than to an absolute complement, the prefix ‘non-’ is a negative
reference to an open class of mutually exclusive contextually appropriate alternative
classifications (where ‘open class’ is a class with undetermined and unfixed
membership). If D={X,Y,Z,...} is that open class of such contextually appropriate
classifications X, Y, Z, and so forth, then ‘non-X’, here symbolized as D-X, is D
minus X: D-X = D\{X}. However, because the elements of D are classes themselves,
the relationship between D-X and any particular is indirect: ‘x is non-X’ means that x
is an element of a class D that is an element of D-X, formally: DD-X [xD]. And
since ‘not’ is just classical negation, ‘x is not non-X’ is nothing but the negation
thereof: DD-X [xD]. In words: there is no contextually appropriate class other
than X, such that x is a member of that class; or shorter: x is not in a different class
(than X).
Although interpretation (2) avoids (direct) commitment to (the existence of) X, it
does so by positing a series of alternative classifications Y, Z, ..., and in (indirect)
violation of (b), is ontologically committed to those: DD-X [xD] (x is non-X)
quantifies over elements of D-X, which are classes determined by universals (above
described as ‘contextually appropriate alternative classifications’). Moreover, anyaapoha similarly applies to Y, Z, ..., and thus, if negative classification assures that X
has no members, then these have no members either. By implication, it is true that
DD-X [xD] for any x and X: if ‘x is not non-X’ it is also ‘not non-Y’, ‘not-non
Z’, and so forth. Therefore, (2) fails, but the reasons for its failure point at the third
interpretation.
(3) The source of (2)’s failure is D, which is effectively a set of universals. This
third interpretation keeps the basic framework of (2), but substitutes Ḋ for D. The
members of Ḋ are not universals, but non-overlapping loose collections of ‘things’ or
experiences deemed not-non-something in previous triangulation events, such that
both the members of Ḋ and their members are salient to the interpreter in the occasion
of the new triangulation event.13 Thus Ḋ is the collection of ‘things’ considered ‘not
non-Y’ before, and remembered, reconstructed, or otherwise (sub-)consciously
activated in the context of the (new) triangulation of x. There may or may not be an
element Ẋ in Ḋ, depending on whether something was triangulated as ‘not non-X’
before. In either case Ḋ-Ẋ excludes that (if ẊḊ then Ḋ-Ẋ=Ḋ\{Ẋ}=Ḋ; if ẊḊ then
Ḋ-Ẋ=Ḋ\{Ẋ}). The members of Ḋ-Ẋ are collections of remembered or reconstructed
past triangulations (or strictly speaking, the particular objects or features involved
therein), and consequently, the object or feature x in the new triangulation can
(barring exceptions such as (partial) loss of memory) not be a member of any of
these. This means that the membership relation in the right-hand part of
13

In actual learning situations, relevant members of Ḋ are often made salient. For example, when
offering a new word to a child, parents often follow up the usage of the new word “with additional
information in the form of a selection of adjacent terms – neighbors from the relevant semantic domain
that help delimit the probable meaning of the new term” (Clark 2010, p. 257).

Comparative Philosophy 3.1 (2012)

BRONS

47

DD-X [xD] in (2) needs to be replaced (in addition to dotting the Ds). In the
process of triangulation, x is compared to contextually salient previous triangulations,
the elements of elements of Ḋ, and found to be similar and/or dissimilar to some. The
relationship between x and some Ḋ (ḊḊ-Ẋ) is that of (subjective and contextually
salient) similarity: sim(x,Ḋ). With those changes to (2), ‘x is non-X’ becomes
ḊḊ-Ẋ [sim(x,Ḋ)], and ‘x is not non-X’ the classical negation thereof:
ḊḊ-Ẋ [sim(x,Ḋ)] (which can be read something like: ‘there is no ♦ collection of
previously triangulated not-non-somethings other than not-non-X, such that x is ♦
similar to the ♦ members of that collection’; in which each ♦ can be replaced with
‘subjectively, contextually salient(ly)’).
Contrary to (2), (3) is not ontologically committed to universals (or universal-like
classes), but merely to collections of (remembered or reconstructed) particulars
loosely bound together by that interpreter’s history of triangulations. An obvious
objection to (3) would be that ‘similarity’ (sim(x,Ḋ)) is too vague and subjective to
guarantee success (see also footnote 10), but there are two counterarguments against
that objection. Firstly, repeated triangulations (of similar particulars) progressively
disambiguate (dis-)similarity and reduce subjectivity. Secondly, the whole process
embeds any singular triangulation in the whole triangulation history of that
interpreter, locking all words and concepts together in a single, (more or less)
coherent whole. Coherence and incoherence with that history and its result (the web
of concepts) also disambiguates (dis-)similarity and reduces subjectivity. The essence
of anya-apoha, or at least this triangulation-infused interpretation thereof, is that the
meaning of a word or concept is not some kind of universal, but its embedded
triangulation history, a history that, moreover, never stops. Rather,
speakers/interpreters (one has to be both to be either) continuously further ‘atune’14
their words and concepts in further communication. In ‘atunement’, at least some
vagueness clears up.
There is a second, perhaps more fundamental type of vagueness involved in
concept formation: the vagueness of what counts as one particular. In addition to the
negative classification (anya-apoha) of ‘things’ (as not-non-something), apoha
similarly constructs (at least some of) the boundaries of (at least some of) the ‘things’
classified. In the above example, illustrated in figure 2, there were nine clearly
distinguishable and discrete particulars, and the process of concept formation merely
added a convenient (negative) classification. However, as Dharmakīrti pointed out,
singular concepts are either grounded in (noumenally caused) singular effects, or are
purely conventional (saṃketa).15 There are many cases in which particular-hood itself
14

In their Thinking through Confucius, Hall and Ames’s (1987) use the term ‘atunement’ for a similar
process. Their Derrida-inspired interpretation of Confucius has interesting similarities with the apohatriangulation integration suggested here. “Classical Chinese is a system of differences, (...) The
meaning of a given sign is (...) determined by its active and passive difference, and that meaning is
never altogether present but deferred” (p. 293).
15
“Eka-vacanam api tad-eka-śakti-sūcana-arthaṃ saṃketa-paratantraṃ vā” (autocommentary (PVSV)
at Pramāṇavārttika 1.141-142). Note that the expression ‘(noumenally caused) singular effects’ is not
an accurate translation of “eka-śakti-sūcana-artha” but a summary of what this fragment refers to: the
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is determined by (negative) classification, where the objects we (phenomenally)
perceive are constructed (kalpana) out of non-discrete indeterminate appearance or
sensory experience, and are therefore conventional (saṃketa). To illustrate this,
consider again a rather abstract example. figure 3 shows a continuum on one spatial
dimension (the x-axis), and with one type of characteristic with infinite values
between two extremes (0 and 1; the y-axis) – a bit like one-dimensional pumpkin
soup with solidity on the y-axis.
figure 3
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Given the right circumstances, an agent could form a concept ‘gu’16 (as ‘not nongu’), but in the same way that particulars could be grouped together differently in
case of the previous example, in this case particular-hood itself can be constructed
differently. For example, there may be an absolute threshold, the dotted line in the
figure, making the concept of ‘gu’ applicable to a, b, {c,d}, and e; or a relative
threshold, which might exclude a, but include f; and depending on the convention
constructed, different bumps in the line are called ‘gu’, and c and d may be
considered one gu or two. This is, of course, a very abstract example, but it can be
easily made less abstract – distinguishing ‘gu’ from ‘non-gu’ could be distinguishing
chunks (from non-chunk) in pumpkin soup; or mountains (from non-mountain) in a
landscape (on a somewhat larger spatial scale). Or perhaps, if the x-axis would
represent time rather than space, distinguishing ‘gu’ could be distinguishing specific
types of events. Whatever the rule for distinguishing ‘gu’ from ‘non-gu’, it is nothing
more than a (constitutive) rule, a convention (saṃketa). There are no real (discrete)
noumenal gus (as a plural of gu); it is that convention that creates phenomenal
instances of ‘gu’.
In other words, the thing-ness (or particular-hood) of (at least) some perceived
‘things’ is itself phenomenal. Indeed, the 9 particulars in figure 2 – as individual,
discrete particulars – may be phenomenal. Furthermore, not just their particular-hood,
but also the ‘one characteristic’ that differentiates them (the x-axis in figure 2) and
that is the basis for classification and concept formation, and similarly, the
characteristic expressed on the y-axis in figure 3, may be phenomenal (as they are in
the explanatory examples). The direct source material for concept formation (and/or
conceptual construction) does not (always) need to be the indeterminate sensory
experience or pratibhāsa that is directly caused by noumenal reality, but may be –
capacity of a collection of svalakṣaṇa (unique spatio-temporally non-extended part-less noumena) to
have a singular effect.
16
Not coincidentally, ‘gu’ (具) is the Japanese word for (among others) (more or less) solid things in
soup.
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and most likely often is – already otherwise determined, hence phenomenal. In such
cases, concept formation adds a conceptual layer, a further classification.
Nevertheless, below (or behind) such ‘layers’ of phenomenal description, there must
be a level of basic concepts (Davidson’s ‘plainest and methodologically most basic
cases’ in the quote in the introduction above, see also 1988a, 44) that is created or
learned in triangulation of shared indeterminate appearance.
5. BOUNDARIES OF TYPES AND TOKENS
Apoha in the narrow sense is classification by exclusion of what is different, negative
classification, to be contrasted with positive classification, which groups things
together on the basis of (perceived) class-internal similarity rather than class-external
difference. Nevertheless, all classification, either negative or positive, either
conceptual or otherwise, is drawing (class) boundaries; drawing boundaries between
‘gu’ and ‘non-gu’ and between ‘defs’ and ‘non-defs’, for example.
The two examples in the previous section illustrate the two kinds of (class)
boundaries involved in conceptual construction and classification: extensional
boundaries and object boundaries, or boundaries of types and tokens. Extensional
boundaries are the outer limits of the extension of a conceptual class or type, such as
the boundaries between ‘defs’ and ‘non-defs’. Object boundaries are the outer limits
of that what is constructed and classified as one instantiation, case, or token of a
certain conceptual type, such as the boundary between one specific instantiation (etc.)
of ‘gu’ and the surrounding ‘non-gu’. In other words, extensional boundaries delimit
types, and object boundaries delimit tokens.
Both kinds of boundaries can be conventional or intrinsic. Conventional
boundaries are more or less arbitrary boundaries that are ‘drawn’ in areas of gradual
rather than discrete difference (between noumenal causes) in the social process of
concept formation. Non-conventional or intrinsic boundaries, on the other hand,
match ‘real’, intrinsic ‘joints’ in noumenal reality and are therefore not created, but
discovered or confirmed. In meta-ontology a similar distinction is often phrased in
terms of the ‘cookie-cutter’ metaphor (concepts cut up noumenal reality into objects
and categories in the way cookie-cutters cut up amorphous dough) versus ‘cutting
nature at its joints’. Metaphysical dualism assumes that (at least a significantly large
share of) boundaries are conventional; non-dualism assumes that they are intrinsic.
Boundaries of types and tokens do not play a role in Davidson’s philosophy
because he implicitly assumed intrinsic boundaries, which – together with the equally
implicit assumption of positive classification – became self-confirming in his
philosophical system. Conventional boundaries are the result of conceptual
construction, and because Davidson assumed that conceptual construction can only
take sense data as its source material, with the rejection of sense data Davidson
rejected conceptual construction (see also sections 2 and 3). Among the many
different names and metaphors used for the notion of ‘conceptual construction’,
Davidson (1974) focused on the rather ambiguous ‘organization’ (aside from ‘fitting’,
which is mostly irrelevant in the present context), but interpreted it as re-organization
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– concepts re-organize what is already (otherwise) (conceptually) organized.
Consequently, he failed to make sense of the notion: “how could something count as
a language that only organizes experiences (...). Surely knives and forks, railroads and
mountains, cabbages and kingdoms also need organizing” (p. 193). Underlying
Davidson’s misunderstanding is the aforementioned implicit (prior) assumption of
intrinsic extensional and object boundaries – ‘things’ are already ‘organized’ (that is:
intrinsically bounded and classified), and therefore, further ‘organization’ can only be
re-organization (or re-classification). However, if ‘things are already organized’, and
thus non-constructed, then all that is left for triangulation is the assignment of names
to things, and triangulation as the necessary link between words and things circularly
confirms their ‘thingness’ (i.e. their intrinsic boundaries). In other words, if ‘defs’ are
grouped together in a triangulatory process based on the unconstructed similarity
between the elements of {d,e,f} (hence, by positive classification), then there really
are (intrinsically bounded, noumenal) ‘defs’. Apoha as negative classification avoids
this conclusion without ending up at the other extreme – according to Dharmakīrti, at
least some, but not necessarily all extensional and object boundaries are purely
conventional (saṃketa).
There seems, moreover, no prima facie reason for Davidson to object to the
apoha-ic extension (or insertion) suggested in the previous section – apoha-ic
construction does not assume sense data (Dharmakīrti rejected that notion; see section
2), which is Davidson’s ground for objection to conceptual construction. Rather in the
contrary, the above interpretation of the apoha-ic notion ‘not non-...’ not only coheres
with Davidson’s holism and rejection of meanings (universals; see sections 3 and 4),
but implies those, and in that way strengthens the ties between triangulation and other
core elements of Davidson’s philosophical system (holism/coherentism particularly).
Let us return to the question that opened this paper: If two communicating beings
are both aware of a certain black queen chess piece as evidenced by their
reference(s) to that black queen chess piece (in their communication), does that imply
that there ‘really’ is (something that is) that black queen chess piece? The two
communicating beings each ‘have’ a type (concept) ‘black queen chess piece’, such
that these types overlap and the shared token is a token of that type-overlap. The
shared-ness of that token implies that the indeterminate appearance (‘sensory
experience’ or pratibhāsa) classified as a ‘black queen chess piece’ is (ultimately)
noumenally caused. Whether that implies that there ‘really’ is (something that is) that
black queen chess piece depends on the nature of the boundaries of type(s) and
token(s), however. The questioned implication can be split up in accordance with the
distinction between those two kinds of boundaries: (1) is there ‘really’ (something
that is) that, or: is there ‘really’ some singular and discrete noumenal ‘thing’ that
corresponds or coincides with that (singular and discrete) black queen chess piece;
and (2) is that something a black queen chess piece (or at least, can that something be
meaningfully be considered to be a black queen chess piece)? The first sub-question
concerns the nature of object (token) boundaries; the second of extensional (type)
boundaries.

Comparative Philosophy 3.1 (2012)

BRONS

51

An intrinsic object boundary implies that there is a singular and discrete noumenal
‘thing’, ‘object’ or ‘entity’ (if such terms apply to the noumenal) causing and
coinciding with the appearance that is classified as a black queen chess piece. A
conventional object boundary, on the other hand, does not have such an implication –
there may be a singular and discrete noumenal cause, but it may also be the case that
more or less arbitrary boundaries are drawn in a ‘landscape’ of non-discrete and
heterogeneous noumenal cause(s) (as in the case of the ‘gu’ example in section 4).
Consequently, the answers to the first sub-question (is there ‘really’ some singular
and discrete noumenal ‘thing’ that corresponds or coincides with that (singular and
discrete) black queen chess piece?) are “yes” if one – like Davidson – assumes the
intrinsic object boundaries that come with ‘non-constructivism’, and “no, not
necessarily” if one – like Dharmakīrti – assumes that at least some object boundaries
are conventional (and that this may be a case of such conventional boundaries).
The second sub-question concerns extensional boundaries. An intrinsic
extensional boundary means that for each of the tokens x1, x2, ... xi of a certain type X
there is a noumenal cause ncxn, such that these noumenal causes ncx1, ncx2, ... ncxi are
identical, or at least very similar, to each other in the relevant (x-token-causing)
respect, and (significantly) different (in the same respect) from noumenal causes of
phenomena that are not tokens of X. In other words, the clear and unambiguous
phenomenal boundary between X and non-X coincides with the equally clear and
unambiguous noumenal boundary that causes it. And if that is the case, and there are
only innocent intermediaries in between the phenomena and their noumenal causes
(see section 2), then there seems little reason to not identify the noumenal causes of
black queen chess pieces as black queen chess pieces – the object of a belief is the
cause of that belief (Davidson 1983, see the quote in the introduction).
A conventional extensional boundary, on the other hand, denies the necessary
existence of a noumenal class boundary coinciding with the phenomenal boundary
and only grants that the noumenal causes of the appearances that in their (linguistic,
situational, etc.) contexts are phenomenalized as tokens x of a certain type X are
insufficiently different to be classified differently (are not non-X; see section 4).
There is a noumenal basis for the classification, but boundaries are drawn by
convention, are context dependent, and (potentially) conceal real differences. Hence,
if there is a class of noumenal causes of tokens x of type X, than that class ‘exists’
only by virtue of the phenomenal distinction between X and non-X, and because the
noumenal was defined above (see section 2) as non-phenomenal, as independent from
our (phenomenal) experience, there is no purely noumenal (-ly determined) class
corresponding with (phenomenal) X.
Consequently, the answers to the second question (can the cause of the
phenomenal black queen chess piece be meaningfully considered to be a black queen
chess piece) are “yes” if one – like Davidson – assumes the intrinsic extensional
boundaries associated with positive classification, and “no” if one – like Dharmakīrti
– assumes that extensional boundaries are conventional. Combining the answers to
the two sub-questions results in two answers to the original question: Yes, the shared
experience of a black queen chess piece implies there really is a black queen chess
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piece. Or: No, that shared experience merely implies that it is noumenally caused, but
its specific phenomenal (or conceptual) effect is or may be largely due to (shared)
convention.
6. “A SHARED, AND LARGELY TRUE, VIEW OF THE WORLD”
Either by means of apoha or triangulation, words and phenomena are grounded in the
noumenal world through a conjunction of a number of conditions – there must be at
least two agents that have the ability to communicate, and that are perceiving the
same ‘things’ and the same similarities and differences between those ‘things’, and at
least one of those agents uses similar signs in the presence of (or to refer to) perceived
to be similar objects. Where apoha and triangulation fundamentally differ is in the
nature of classification of (relevant) experiences (of ‘things’) – while apoha as
exclusion is negative and thus constructive, Davidson implicitly assumes a positive,
non-constructive form of classification. Consequently, ‘def’ is not defined by
difference from ‘non-def’, but by similarity between the things labeled as ‘def’, which
suggests perceiving them as instantiations of ‘def’, as defs. In other words, contrary to
apoha, (positive) classification based on similarity invites (but not justifies) the idea
that having a concept ‘def’ implies that there are defs, and therefore, that language
gives us more or less direct access to the (real) world. And it is exactly this
illegitimate conclusion that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti wanted to avoid (e.g. Matilal
1971).
On the other hand, having a concept of ‘def’ does imply that there are shared
indeterminate appearances (‘sensory experience’ or pratibhāsa) in which that concept
is grounded, and the ultimate cause of such shared indeterminate appearances can
only be noumenal (the distal stimulus). Furthermore, the rejection of a noumenal
category corresponding with (phenomenal) ‘def’ because of the non-identity of its
supposed members implies that we are or can become aware of that non-identity. And
if that is the case, we can triangulate and conceptualize the difference(s). Perhaps
every ‘thing’ that is classified as (not-non-) ‘def’ is uniquely different, and every
‘thing’ constructed as ‘gu’ is merely a conventional construction, and therefore, there
really are no defs and gus, but we can be (or become) aware of those differences,
conventions and constructions and describe those. Hence, conceptual categories are
deceptive or illusory only to the extent of our (contingent) inability or unwillingness
to ‘see’ beyond (ordinary) words. Aside from that contingency (or unwillingness),
phenomenal perception can only be subjective, deceptive, or illusory in the minimal
sense regarded ‘mere empirical accidence without philosophical significance’ by
Davidson (see section 2).
In the previous section it was shown that his rejection of conceptual construction
and implicit assumption of positive classification would lead Davidson to answer
“yes” to the black chess queen question. That answer, however, does not depend
thereon – an apoha-enriched Davidson would still answer “yes”. Davidson’s key
point is that “successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely
true, view of the world” (1977, 201), that shared phenomena are necessarily

Comparative Philosophy 3.1 (2012)

BRONS

53

noumenally caused (or that a shared stimulus is a distal stimulus, in more
Davidsonian terminology), and that, given the innocence of causal (rather than
epistemic) intermediaries, phenomena are non-deceptive (or only ‘deceptive’ in a
very limited sense) and that we can in principle become aware of the ‘real nature’ of
things. The abandonment of positive classification results in the recognition of the
difference of (identically named) ‘things’, but the noumenal causation of those
differences implies that those can be triangulated and conceptualized. The black chess
queen piece may be a phenomenal construction, and there may thus not strictly
speaking be a noumenal black chess queen, but the shared phenomenon’s cause does
(noumenally) really have certain (triangulable) properties that make us perceive it as
such (in the given context). That is enough to answer “yes”.
Davidson and Dharmakīrti largely shared the idea that words or concepts are
(ultimately) noumenally grounded conventions, but differed in focus and attributed
implication. While for Davidson the noumenal grounding of words (and thought)
implied that they somehow stand for noumenally real things (ignoring the intricacies
of Davidson’s thought about that relationship), thus downplaying their
conventionality,17 it is that conventionality which Dharmakīrti stressed, and which for
him implied that conceptual categories are (noumenally) unreal. The difference seems
largely ideological – Davidson wanted to prove ‘unmediated touch’ with noumenal
objects as much as it was an indubitable premise for Dharmakīrti that the phenomenal
or conventional world is an illusion. This ‘ideological difference’ reveals a difference
in purpose (of the argument), and a difference between the questions Dharmakīrti and
Davidson intended to answer. Because of that difference, for Davidson the question
about the black queen chess piece would be a question about necessary noumenal
causes, about subjectivity and about the possibility of deception by the senses; for
Dharmakīrti it would be a question about the nature of things independent from our
experience. Hence, the different answers: “no, the black queen chess piece is not
(really) a black queen chess piece independent of our experience, but yes, there is a
noumenally real cause of our shared experience of that black queen chess piece, and
that experience is no deception”. These answers, however, are complementary rather
than contradictory.
These answers are also somewhat unsatisfactory because they remain two
separate answers. By integrating apoha and triangulation, section 4 transcended the
apparent contradiction between Davidson’s argument that our (phenomenal) beliefs
about the (noumenal) world cannot be massively wrong, and Dharmakīrti’s belief in
17

That concepts are conventional, as argued here, does not imply that such – or other – conventions are
necessary for communication, which Davidson rejected in (1982c) and (1986) (and which also more or
less follows from the theory of triangulation itself). Concepts are conventions in the sense that they are
created in a social process involving shared objects of beliefs (the real ‘things’ referred to); they are
conventions between the participants in triangulation (hence, involving those shared objects).
Davidson’s critique of conventions in (1982c) and (1986) rejects the idea that language and
communication necessarily involve more or less fixed conventions between all speakers of a language,
that social conventions are constitutive of meaning. It is a rejection of social externalism about mental
content (see also 1990a) in favor of an externalism that is both social and physical, i.e. triangulation.
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the (ultimate) illusoriness of the phenomenal world. The key point of that integration
is that our grounding of words and phenomena in the (noumenal) world may be
imperfect in the sense that words (may) conceal real differences, but that a shared
noumenal world implies that those differences can be triangulated and
conceptualized, and therefore, that conceptual categories are deceptive or illusory
only to the extent of our (contingent) inability or unwillingness to ‘see’ beyond
(ordinary) words.
This metaphor of ‘seeing beyond words’ is a central theme in many currents of
Chinese (and Japanese) Buddhist philosophy (most famously, Chán/Zen), which
mostly rejected metaphysical dualism (but not the epistemological dualism at the core
of Buddhist thought). Such ‘seeing beyond words’ is often interpreted as conscious,
non-conceptual perception (or experience), which was rejected in section 2, but
whether this interpretation is correct is not the issue here. Above, the bracketed word
‘ordinary’ was added: ‘seeing beyond (ordinary) words’. The point here (and possibly
in (some) Chinese/Japanese Buddhist philosophy as well) is not the impossible goal
of conscious, non-conceptual experience, but a critical examination of the categories
given in our (ordinary) language. ‘Ordinary’ is again bracketed here, because the
construction of arbitrary conventional boundaries (as in both examples in section 4) is
not necessarily limited to ordinary concepts. However, such ‘critical examination’
necessarily takes place in language – determination of non-identity of the members of
a conceptual class requires triangulation and conceptualization or description. Hence,
‘seeing beyond (ordinary) words’ extends rather than rejects language, and it is still
‘seeing through words’, but ‘seeing through’ in both senses of ‘through’.
‘Seeing beyond (ordinary) words’ denotes a ‘middle path’ between two
conflicting dogmas: the illusoriness of conventional (phenomenal) reality (and the
associated rejection of the categories of (ordinary) language as noumenally true) in
Buddhist philosophy, and the authority of ordinary language in analytic philosophy;
between the Buddhist wholesale rejection of language as a guide to the (noumenally)
real world, and the common ‘analytic’ belief in ordinary language as truly and
objectively representing reality.18 (Ordinary) language is to some extent deceptive,
but only to some extent, and the necessary (social) grounding of words in the real
world through apoha or triangulation also implies the possibility of uncovering
‘deception’: of uncovering the conventional nature of (at least some) conceptual
(class) boundaries and their real grounds.19
The apoha-triangulation integration suggested in this paper (see sections 4 and 5)
neither guarantees the identity of phenomena and noumena as assumed in
metaphysical non-dualism, nor implies the dualist conception of the phenomenal 18

Most of Buddhist philosophy involved the claim that phenomenal (conventional) reality is illusory,
but not all. And most of analytic philosophy beliefs in the authority of ordinary language, not all.
Hence, these two ‘dogma’s’ are not universal.
19
This leaves metaphysics with the question of how to determine what is conventional/constructed, and
what is (noumenally) real. If at least some, but not (necessarily) all, boundaries are conventional, then
how can one know which boundaries are intrinsic and which are conventional, or which phenomena
are constructed and which coincide with discrete (intrinsically bounded) noumena, hence ‘are real’?
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noumenal divide as an unbridgeable chasm, but rather suggests another ‘middle path’
– a middle path between dualism and non-dualism. There is a gap between the
noumenal and the phenomenal, but it is not an unbridgeable gap. Communication
(triangulation) continuously creates bridges, but also enables us to build further
bridges, and that possibility of building bridges means that the gap, rather than
irrelevant because it is (believed to be) either non-existent or too wide, is an invitation
for further inquiry.
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HOW TO AVOID SOLIPSISM WHILE REMAINING AN IDEALIST:
LESSONS FROM BERKELEY AND DHARMAKĪRTI
JEREMY E. HENKEL
ABSTRACT: This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to
deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence
of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the
existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of
intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow
him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it
nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite minds. I argue that
Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement causally, is able to avoid
Berkeley’s shortcoming. I conclude by considering a challenge to Dharmakīrti’s use of
inference that Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist successor of Dharmakīrti, advances in his “Disproof of
the Existence of Other Minds” and briefly exploring a possible response that someone who
wants to advocate an idealist position could give.
Keywords: Berkeley, Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti, idealism, solipsism, philosophy of mind

1. INTRODUCTION: IDEALISM AND SOLIPSISM
Ever since Descartes (at least) in the West, and for far longer in India, philosophers
have entertained the possibility that the whole world is illusory, our experience of an
external world merely the result of delusion. As fun as it can be to entertain this
notion in films and introductory philosophy classes, however, and despite a plethora
of sophisticated defenses of it in Western and Eastern philosophical traditions alike,
idealism is a difficult position to genuinely and consistently subscribe to. Aside from
simply being counterintuitive, one of the primary challenges to idealism is the
apparent implication from idealism to solipsism. Descartes, of course, saw this. The
whole point of continuing beyond the Second Meditation is to avoid solipsism:
If the objective reality of any of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same
reality does not reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot
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be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some
other thing which is the cause of this idea also exists. But if no such idea is to be found in
me, I shall have no argument to convince me of the existence of anything apart from
myself. (Descartes (1641/1984), p. 29; emphasis added)

I take it for granted, as did Descartes, that solipsism is an unacceptable philosophical
position. In fact, if Wittgenstein’s argument against private languages is correct, then
solipsism is not just objectionable but actually incoherent. The Private Language
Argument indicates that, if I were alone in the universe, language would be
impossible and I would thus be unable to even formulate the question of whether I
were alone in the universe.
If solipsism is untenable, then if it can be established that idealism leads to
solipsism, it follows that idealism, too, is untenable. There are at least two reasons to
believe that idealism entails solipsism. First is the problem of intersubjective
agreement. If everything is mind, and all anyone can perceive is his or her own ideas,
then how do you and I come to agree not only that, say, there is a tree in front of us,
but even in our descriptions of that tree? A realist will press this issue because
solipsism seems to be the only recourse for the idealist to respond to the problem of
intersubjective agreement: “we” agree because what I take to be “you” is just another
idea in my mind.
The second reason to believe that idealism entails solipsism involves the principle
of parsimony. Arguments in favor of idealism typically rely on the premise that all of
our experience can be explained—and indeed explained better—without reference to
or reliance on an external world, and on the principle that whatever is found
unnecessary in accounting for our experience ought not be posited to exist. But the
principle of parsimony, in doing away with material substance, seems to be no less
ruthless with other minds. My experience of the so-called external world seems to be
the only basis for my belief in the existence of anything beyond myself and my
perceptions. So if I can be made to doubt the existence of the physical body I see
directly in front of me, then how much more dubious must be the notion of an
unperceived mind that motivates that non-existent body? If I have no reason to
believe in the independent existence of those objects that I perceive to lie outside my
body—indeed, no reason to believe even in the existence of my body—then I have no
grounds on which to justify a belief in the existence of minds, of which I have even
less alleged experience. If all I can know are the modifications of my own mind, then
just as the principle of parsimony demands that we eliminate material substance from
our ontology once we have shown it to be unnecessary, so too does it demand that I
eliminate any notion of other mind from my own ontology: one stream of subjective
consciousness is enough to explain all experienced phenomena—including those that
themselves are allegedly experiencing phenomena.
Neither of these concerns relies on a particular (Western or non-Western) way of
framing the issue. Given the abundance of philosophers who have advocated
idealism, we should expect to find that such philosophers have challenged either the
view that solipsism is problematic or the view that idealism entails solipsism. The
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majority, perhaps not surprisingly, have opted for the latter. In the remainder of this
essay, I will examine how Berkeley, the most prominent of early-modern idealists,
and Dharmakīrti, who among Yogācārins put forward the most detailed argument for
the existence of other minds, attempt to establish the co-possibility of idealism and
knowledge of other minds. Beginning from quite similar arguments for the nonexistence of matter, the two philosophers employ rather different strategies for
establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems, among other things,
from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. Berkeley’s reliance
on his Cartesian inheritance allows him to account for intersubjective agreement
without descending into solipsism, but it prevents him from establishing the existence
of other finite minds. Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement
causally, is able to avoid Berkeley’s limitation. But, as we will see in the conclusion
of this essay, a new objection awaits Dharmakīrti. And this objection, coming as it
does from a fellow idealist, proves to be much less easily dispatched. This final
objection, I contend, can be useful in pointing out to idealists—Buddhist and nonBuddhist alike—an important direction to take the discussion in order to finally put
down for good the solipsism objection.
2. BERKELEY AND OTHER MINDS
In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley argues from
the empiricist premise that ideas are the only possible objects of knowledge to the
conclusion that there exists no material world. His argument for idealism involves
three steps. The first step is to establish that a material world, if any such world were
to exist, is not a possible object of knowledge. It is the nature of ideas, according to
Berkeley, to be perceived. As such, they are inert, wholly passive. But the idea of a
material world is the idea of a world of objects that are capable of acting as causes—
as causes of our ideas of those objects, at the very least. This common-sense
conception of the world is one in which our ideas resemble the objects that cause
them. But common sense, according to Berkeley, is greatly mistaken, for “an idea can
be like nothing but an idea” (1710/1998a, p. 105). It is as incoherent to claim that an
idea can resemble a material object as it is to claim that a smell can resemble a
shape—they are wholly incommensurate sorts of things. If all we can know are ideas,
and if ideas cannot be of a material world, then there can be no knowledge of a
material world.
The second step in Berkeley’s argument for idealism involves establishing that a
material world is not necessary in order to explain our seeming experience of one. He
uses the classic example of “dreams, frenzies, and the like” as evidence that, while
our ideas can only be caused by some sort of substance, it need not be material
substance: “[I]t is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now,
though no bodies existed without, resembling them” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 109).
The Crux of Berkeley’s argument for idealism, though, is the third step, wherein
he seeks to establish that a material world is not only unnecessary but indeed
incoherent. He challenges the reader:
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if you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or in general, for
any one idea or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I
shall readily give up the cause…I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either
give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed
to exist. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 110)

He explains in the next paragraph why such a challenge cannot possibly be met:
meeting it would entail thinking of an object unthought-of, or conceiving of an object
unconceived-of—“which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to
conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our
own ideas” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 111). The incoherence of the concept of
material substance being thus established, Berkeley concludes that the only rational
option is to adopt idealism as our standpoint: “it remains therefore that the cause of
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 112).
This is the point in Berkeley’s argument at which the spectre of solipsism appears.
The very arguments that he used to demonstrate that one can have no grounds for
belief in a physical world seem also to imply that one can have no grounds for belief
in any spirit—or mind—other than one’s own. Berkeley argues that the notion of
spirit comes from direct intuition of one’s own status as experiencer. In his Three
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous Berkeley explains how it is that we can be
aware of the existence of spirit despite the impossibility of a corresponding idea.
Speaking in the voice of Philonous, in the Third Dialogue he makes the point that
perception—which gives rise to ideas—is just one of the three permissible grounds
for belief (Berkeley, 1713/1998a, pp. 115-117). We can defensibly believe in
something of which we have no idea if we have a direct intuition of that thing or if the
existence of that thing is a necessary presupposition for or consequence of something
that we do know (that is, if it can be directly experienced or logically inferred from
direct experience). Spirit is thus rendered unproblematic, as every idea we experience
carries with it a direct intuition of the spirit that is the experiencer of that idea.
Awareness of one’s own mind, coming as it does through direct intuition, cannot be
called knowledge because it does not lead to an idea of mind; it does, however, lead
to what Berkeley calls a notion of mind.1 But, since we do not have direct intuition of
other spirits, belief in the existence of other minds seems to be no more justified than
belief in the physical world. Berkeley’s solution to this problem is that belief in other
minds can be justified through inference.
In the beginning of the Treatise Berkeley states that ideas can arise through senseexperience, the passions, or imagination (including memory) (1710/1998a, p. 103).
His inference to the existence of other minds begins from the recognition that our
experiences of the different sorts of ideas are themselves qualitatively different.
1

Berkeley’s insistence that awareness of one’s own mind is not knowledge is interestingly similar to
Wittgenstein’s dictum in the Philosophical Investigations (§246) that knowledge of one’s own pain
makes no sense—that such a claim betrays a failure to understand what we normally mean in our use
of the word ‘knowledge’. ‘Knowledge’ makes sense only within the context of the possibility for error.
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Whereas the ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to
my will, my sense-experiences are not similarly compliant:
But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually
perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I
open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or not, or to determine
what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the
hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There
is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, 113)

My experience of ideas that do not find their cause in my mind is not, for Berkeley, a
refutation of the thesis that all ideas have their origin in mind (and so a rejection of
idealism); rather, it is a confirmation that mine is not the only mind. While I have no
direct intuition of others’ minds, I do have sense-experience of actions that reveal the
workings of a mind, which themselves form the basis of a valid inference to the
existence of a mind as the volition behind the action. My further recognition that
these volitional actions are not subject to my own will reveals to me the existence of a
will other than my own. I thus come by my notion of other mind in addition to my
notion of my own mind.2 As Anita Avramides points out, despite many
commentators’ arguments to the contrary, this is not an argument by analogy a la
Mill. Rather, this is a causal argument, taking the following form:
P1: All ideas are caused by some mind.
P2: I experience ideas that are independent of my will.
P3: Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than
my own.
C1: Therefore, a mind other than my own exists.
Having thus explained the difference between our different sorts of ideas,
Berkeley is in a position to address the realist’s concern regarding intersubjective
agreement. Given the passivity of perception—as opposed to the activity of
imagination—it makes sense that other people too will find their ideas of sense to be
independent of their will. Ideas of sense thus being imposed on our experience, it is
not surprising that different people’s reports of sense-experience agree with one
another in a way that their reports of those mental states that are subject to an
individual’s will do not. But given the conclusion, already established by this point,
that all ideas are caused by mind, Berkeley must give an account of the sort of mind
2

Cf. Also what he says in paragraph 145 (1710/1998a, p. 157). Berkeley is subject to a biting criticism
here: what if, in considering my ideas to be unchosen by my will, I have deceived myself? The
paradigm case of this is, of course, dreams, but one could argue that addicts deceive themselves when
they claim that their cravings come unbidden. It is interesting to note that, though he twice mentions
dreams (paragraphs 18 and 42) in support of his idealist thesis, Berkeley does not seem to have
considered the possibility that dreams could pose a counterexample, calling into question the validity
of this inference. I will more fully examine the dream objection below, in the context of Dharmakīrti’s
response to it.
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that would be necessary to explain the seemingly independent existence of senseideas. Clearly, the mind that is the source of such ideas must be qualitatively different
from a human mind. The ideas of imagination that people experience
are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being
impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the
effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p.
115)

For Berkeley, then, intersubjective agreement and the stability of an individual’s
sense-ideas are intertwined—and neither presents a difficulty that the idealist cannot
respond to. Our sense-ideas are stable and a matter of intersubjective agreement
because our ideas of sense are caused by God: an infinite mind that keeps everything
in existence by being a perpetual perceiver.
To summarize: for Berkeley, intersubjective agreement blocks the inference from
idealism to solipsism, rather than demanding it. Intersubjective agreement is a result
of our sense ideas being more stable than our imagination-based ideas, and this itself
is a result of the existence of a qualitatively different mind. The principle of
parsimony thus does not demand an inference from idealism to solipsism. Once it has
done away with the material world, it in fact demands the existence of another mind
to explain our experiences: the mind of God.
At this point Berkeley is subject to a critical objection: insofar as he succeeds at
proving the existence of God, he seems to eliminate any reason for believing in other
finite minds. With God as a sufficient cause of all my ideas, I no longer find myself in
a position to infer distinct individual minds motivating the representations I have of
my spouse and my child—both are merely aspects of God’s universal mind.3 If this
objection succeeds, then Berkeley may have avoided solipsism, but with the result of
existing alone in the universe with God. Such a prospect is little, if at all, more
appealing than solipsism.
Berkeley’s reply to this objection calls to mind Descartes. It is the uniformity of
experience, he points out, that makes the benefit—and even the maintenance—of life
possible: “And without this we should be eternally at a loss: we could not know how
to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of
sense” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 113). The intra- and interpersonal regularity of
sense-ideas, which are not subject to one’s own will, Berkeley takes to be a mark of
the benevolence of the will that is their author. And once we can be confident in the
existence of a benevolent God, we have no reason to assume that our belief in other
minds is a result of deception.
But it is not at all clear that this response does succeed. Berkeley is correct that
the regularity of experience is a necessary condition for the maintenance of life, but
from this we cannot infer a benevolent God at all: all Berkeley is justified in inferring
from the stability of our sense-ideas is a mind that wants us to have experience that is
3

This objection is posed by Jonathan Bennett. Avramides (2001, p. 125-130) makes considerable use
of it in her explication of Berkeley, and I am following her analysis.
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coherently enough ordered to be called experience at all. But since the author of our
sense-ideas could well have the maximization of pain and misery as a goal, this could
be a mark of malevolence just as easily as it could be of benevolence. All we need to
do to see the truth of this is to consider the case of torture. On the assumption that
one’s purpose is to maximize the pain and suffering of another, the primary objective
must be to keep that person alive and lucid enough to experience suffering. And
cultivating in that person a belief in the existence of loved ones, who themselves can
seem to suffer or cause suffering in the subject through various other means, is
certainly a powerful tool for increasing the experience of suffering.
Berkeley’s argument for the existence of other finite minds hinges on the ability
to infer God’s benevolence from the orderliness of one’s experience. This inference
fails. Thus Berkeley seems to be unwittingly committed, if not to solipsism, then to
the belief that in addition to oneself only God exists. His contention (1710/1998a, p.
158) that we have even greater ground for belief in God than in the existence of other
finite minds is thus true, but in a way that he never intended.
The medieval Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti is as concerned as Berkeley is to
show that idealism does not entail solipsism. Dharmakīrti’s response to the problem
of intersubjective agreement differs markedly from Berkeley’s, however; this
difference saves him from the concerns that plague Berkeley’s account. Let us turn
now to Dharmakīrti’s arguments.
3. DHARMAKIRTI AND OTHER STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
As a member of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, Dharmakīrti inherits arguments
for idealism that are similar to the arguments we have already seen from Berkeley.
Vasubandhu’s Twenty Verses (Vimśatikā), for instance, makes use of dreams and
cases of perceptual error (eye-diseases, illusions) to show that all our experiences can
be explained without reference to physical causes. Among Dharmakīrti’s unique
contributions is the argument from constant co-cognition (sahopalambhaniyama),
which anticipates by more than a millenium Berkeley’s argument for idealism. In the
Pramānavārttika Dharmakīrti points out that, for any two objects, if they are distinct
then they will be available in isolation from one another. But blue, for instance, is
never found in isolation from awareness of blue. It follows, then, that blue and
awareness of blue are non-distinct. Since the same deduction can be made with regard
to any object or property—a pot is never found distinct from awareness of the pot,
heat is never found distinct from awareness of heat, etc.—we are left to conclude that
the world consists in nothing more than various states of awareness. Anything that I
take to be an external object is nothing more than my mental state.
Dharmakīrti’s argument for idealism, then, is quite similar to Berkeley’s argument
for the incoherence of extended matter. But despite the similarity in starting points,
Dharmakīrti’s idealism takes on a significantly different feel from Berkeley’s. In his
Proof of the Existence of Other Streams of Consciousness (Santānāntarasiddhi;
hereafter Proof), Dharmakīrti provides what is perhaps still the most extensive
argument that idealism does not imply solipsism that has yet been advanced. He
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argues for an inference to the existence of other streams of consciousness4 that is
similar to what Berkeley advocates, but he stops short of concluding the existence of
God. Instead he provides a causal account of intersubjective agreement that is unlike
anything we find in Berkeley. In this section I will argue that this move saves
Dharmakīrti from Berkeley’s fate and thus, if his inference to other streams of
consciousness works, then Dharmakīrti shows idealism not to lead to solipsism in a
more tenable way than does Berkeley.
Much of Dharmakīrti’s argument amounts to demonstrating that knowledge of
other streams of consciousness is no more problematic for the idealist than for the
realist because they use the same method. The realist will agree with the idealist that
we have no direct perception (pratyakṣa) of others’ mental states, and thus that any
knowledge we can have must come by means of inference (anumāna). The realist,
believing that extended objects exist in an external world, infers the existence of the
mental from physical evidence. The only difference from this account for the idealist
is that idealists understand the evidence to be a mental representation of a physical
act, rather than the physical act itself. But, Dharmakīrti points out, this does not
indicate a difference at all, because the realist makes precisely the same inference:
idealists and realists alike infer the existence of other minds from mental
representations of actions, not from actions themselves. To prove this, he asks
whether we come to cognize another’s consciousness from the mere existence of
action, or only from the actual perception of that action. Clearly the mere existence is
not sufficient, otherwise everyone would have knowledge of all other
consciousnesses. Thus the inference is not from the action, but from one’s
perception—that is, mental representation—of actions and speech. We only know that
our mental representations are caused by another consciousness; we can say nothing
about acts in themselves (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 40-47).
For Dharmakīrti, then, idealism does not entail solipsism any more than realism
entails solipsism: both the idealist and the realist infer the existence of other streams
of consciousness from the experience of volitional actions that do not originate within
one’s own stream of consciousness. It remains to establish exactly how, according to
Dharmakīrti, that inference proceeds. He says that all volitional actions—such as
speech and other movements that reveal intentionality—have their origin in
consciousness. Those volitional actions that I experience subjectively as originating
from within provide a confirmation of this: my actions reveal my intentions, and my
lack of action reveals a corresponding lack of intention. The subjectively-experienced
actions also provide an example of how volitional actions manifest, which helps me
to recognize those volitional actions that I experience objectively (that is, as
4

Being a Buddhist, Dharmakīrti of course does not believe in the existence of “minds” per se. In
denying the existence of the ātman, the Buddhist denies that there is an irreducible subject of
experience that has privileged epistemic status—something that Berkeley, due to his Cartesian
inheritance, takes for granted. Nevertheless, what Berkeley wants to call “mind, spirit, soul, or my
self” the Buddhist will call a “santāna” or “stream of consciousness”, thereby acknowledging the
perceived unity of an individual life while denying any unchanging substance that underlies this
perceived unity.
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originating from without) as volitional, despite the phenomenological difference in
how they are experienced.
The difference between subjectively and objectively experienced volitional
actions amounts to a difference between experience and non-experience of the
causally efficacious mental states that lead to the action. Objectively experienced
volitional actions are those that I cannot find the cause of within my own stream of
consciousness. Knowing that if they had their cause within me I would be aware of it,
I conclude that such actions have their cause outside my own consciousness. Having
established that all volitional actions are similar in having their origin in
consciousness, and that objectively-experienced volitional actions differ from
subjectively-experienced ones by virtue of not having their origin in my
consciousness, the conclusion follows that objectively-experienced volitional actions
have their origin in another consciousness—which means, of course, that another
consciousness exists. Thus, Dharmakīrti concludes, the idealist is able to infer the
existence of other streams of consciousness: “Between the concept of mind in general
and that of its external manifestations in movements and speech, there is a causal
relation, and on the basis of the effect, we shall cognize the cause” (1969, Verse 48).
Dharmakīrti’s argument for the existence of other streams of consciousness, then,
takes the following form:
P4:
P5:
P6:
C2:
C3:

I experience actions of a certain type.5
Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness.
These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness.
Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness.
Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist.

Like Berkeley, Dharmakīrti argues that awareness of other minds can be justified
through logical implication. However, Dharmakīrti would not agree with Berkeley
that the differences between our sense-ideas and our other ideas—which differences
explain the phenomenon of intersubjective agreement—give proof of a qualitatively
different sort of consciousness as their cause. Instead, Dharmakīrti shows that
intersubjective agreement can be explained causally even among a community of
finite minds. People’s reports of the “external world” agree because they have similar
causal histories and similar perceptual mechanisms. In any circumstance, given
(nearly) identical causes, one would expect (nearly) identical effects. So if the causal
explanation for my perception of the tree is the same as that for your perception of the
tree, then it should come as no surprise that our experiences of that tree are
themselves similar. And this is true for the realist just as much as for the idealist.
Someone in Istanbul and someone in Tokyo cannot directly experience the same
I use the word ‘type’ here advisedly, as Dharmakīrti’s denial that sāmānyalakṣaṇas are ultimately
real (because not causally efficacious) precludes him ascribing any substantial reality to types. But his
apoha theory does, I take it, provide him with the tools necessary to make sense of a differentiation
between actions that reveal volition and those that do not. (I thank the anonymous reviewer of this
journal for encouraging me to be clearer on this point.)
5
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tree—at least, not at the same time—and this because of their distinct causal histories,
which have led them to be in vastly different locations. However, a person and a bat,
if they were somehow able to communicate with one another, would be highly
unlikely to agree in their descriptions of a tree they were both in proximity of because
of the differences between each’s perceptual apparatus. Indeed, it does not seem
absurd here to suggest that they may not be experiencing the same tree at all.
Dharmakīrti insists that we need not posit the existence of the object experienced
in order to account for intersubjective agreement. To make his point, he uses the
example of two people with the same eye condition, both of whom think they see two
moons. Their agreement in experience is not caused by an object that corresponds to
and causes their experience, but by the agreement of the causal factors in their
perception. This illustrates that there need be no external object causing the
experiences in order for the experiencers to agree in their reports of their individual
experiences (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 65). By explaining intersubjective agreement
without appeal to a consciousness that is qualitatively different from human
consciousness, Dharmakīrti avoids the conclusion that Berkeley could not: that one is
alone in the universe with God.
An important objection can be raised against Dharmakīrti here, however. The
example he uses, it seems, does not succeed, because even here the erroneous
perception is caused not just by the faulty eyes, but also by the materially existent
moon. The only proper analogy we have to what experience would be like without
external objects to regulate it, the objection continues, is our experience of dreams.
But in dreams there is no agreement between experiencers. One’s dream experiences
are one’s own; within the dream there is no other experiencer, and once outside the
dream one finds that nobody else’s experience agrees with the experience one had
within that dream. This objection seems to strike right to the heart of Dharmakīrti’s
argument, not just regarding intersubjective agreement but regarding the inference to
other streams of consciousness at all: for if all our waking experience is akin to our
dream experiences, then inferring the existence of other consciousness from the
appearance of volitional action seems highly dubious. In dreams I frequently
experience the representations of volitional actions that seem to have their source
outside me. But subsequent waking experience informs me that my original
assessment was incorrect, that those experiences were the result of no consciousness
other than my own. And if it is possible to experience representations of a volitional
action as caused by a consciousness other than my own when they are in fact caused
by my own, then in no instance am I justified in inferring the existence of another
consciousness merely from such a representation. But since the idealist cannot
provide another account, we must conclude that idealism does in fact commit one to
solipsism.
Dharmakīrti is well aware of the dream objection. In fact, the bulk of the Proof is
dedicated to refuting it. His response begins by pointing out that the realist’s account
of dreams is no less problematic than is the idealist’s. If, as according to the realist,
objectively experienced volitional actions within a dream do not provide a valid
ground for inferring other consciousnesses, then neither do they in waking life. Such
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an inference can be legitimate only if it is valid universally; if dream-experiences
block the inference, then we can no longer say that objectively experienced volitional
actions are a consistent mark of the existence of other minds—in the parlance of
Indian logic, pervasion (vyapti) is lost. We are thus, according to this argument, never
justified in inferring the existence of another mind from objectively experienced
volitional actions, even when we are awake (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 53-58).
Dharmakīrti provides a ready response to this concern—one that is available to the
realist and the idealist alike. He points out that the inference to another consciousness
that occurs within a dream is valid within the dream (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 8387). The error arises if, after we wake up, we try to carry the inference over into the
waking world. For Dharmakīrti, the best criterion we can have for the truth of a
cognition (jñāna) is successful action. The actual existence of the object inferred is
thus not a necessary (or, given his idealist leanings, even a possible) condition for the
validity of an inference. The question is, rather, whether actions that are based on that
inference meet with success or with frustration. Given that the inferences to the
existence of other streams of consciousness that we make within our dreams do lead
to successful action within said dreams, the dream-inference must be taken as valid:
Those inferences of other mind which are made in sleep are possible only in such a state;
exactly thus, the attainment of aim—the conversations, etc—which take place in sleep,
are [also] possible only at this time. But since at this time is possible such an activity as is
not contradictory, has mutual bond and is logical, there is no inconsistency in our theory.
(Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 87 Commentary)

Since the inference leads to successful activity, it would be absurd to insist that we
have no dream-experience of other consciousness simply because the marks by which
we infer such consciousness are not present in waking experience. Given our
successful ability to navigate the social world when awake, it is similarly absurd to
say that we have no waking experience of other consciousness simply because the
marks of other consciousness do not exist in the manner the realist thinks they do.
Dharmakīrti provides another, more obscure response to the dream objection as
well. In Verse 51 he says,
In [cases of] illusions, the course of our representations is under the influence of special
causes, the nature of which determines the content of the representations. The
representations may also be caused by other mind and [various] other factors, in which
case there is sometimes an interruption in time between these factors and the
representations; but these representations cannot appear quite independently of them.

This passage is difficult to interpret, and Vinītadeva’s gloss does little to clarify, but
one possibility is that Dharmakīrti is making the point that the mere existence of
dreams presupposes objective experience, on which dreams are based. On this
reading the dream-representations I experience of volitional action, while directly
dependent on only my mental states, are indirectly dependent on the mental states of
others—because the possibility of my presently having mental states that represent
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another’s volitional action is dependent on my having antecedently had actual
experience of such cases. This seems to be a plausible point for Dharmakīrti to make.
Some support for the position can be found in studies that have indicated that
congenitally blind people have sightless dreams, though they experience other dreamsensations just as much as sighted people do (Kerr and Domhoff, 2004).
These two responses, taken together, I think are sufficient to undermine the dream
objection. But other objections remain—objections to which Dharmakīrti provides
less thorough responses. One that strikes me as particularly powerful is this: if the
goal of an inference is to prove that a particular event has its origin in consciousness,
then by asserting that the event in question is a volitional act is Dharmakīrti begging
the question? After all, if he has defined volitional actions as those having their origin
in consciousness, then for any event under consideration it should begin as an open
question whether that event is a volitional action. Throughout the Proof, speech is
taken to be an inferential mark of consciousness. But a bird that can imitate human
speech is not taken to be expressing the mental state that we would take such speech
to indicate if uttered by a human. Why, then, assume that people’s speech indicates
volition?
There is an easy response to this objection, which likely explains why
Dharmakīrti did not bother considering the objection at all. Given the idealist thesis,
everything that we experience either has its cause in consciousness or is uncaused.
But on the Buddhist metaphysical framework, nothing is uncaused. It follows that
everything has its cause in consciousness. The only question, then, is whether the
consciousness that is originary to this particular event is one’s own. But that is what
this whole inquiry aims to answer, and thus there is no logical flaw in beginning from
this starting point.
This response, however, seems insufficient because it overlooks some of the
underlying concerns behind the objection. Particularly, it does not answer the
question of why we do not take the bird that mimics human speech to be expressing a
volition, but we do take people to. (Note that we take the bird to be mimicking human
speech, not speaking.) Relatedly, we sometimes do not hold people to be responsible
for their speech and actions: how do we justify such an inconsistency in our
attributions? How do I really know whether a person’s volitional actions have their
origin in her consciousness? Fortunately, even though Dharmakīrti does not respond
to my concern about question-begging directly, he does address the concerns that
motivate it.
To begin with, his Verse 51 response to the dream objection and his later response
to the challenge that inference to other consciousness is not pramāṇa (Dharmakīrti,
1969, Verses 66-72) remind us of the Buddhist success-criterion for truth. Starting
from the assumption that what I experience as speech emanating from another reveals
a consciousness within that other as cause of that speech, my ensuing activity will
meet with either success or frustration, depending on the circumstance. Attempting to
engage a bird in discussion meets with much more frustration than success, and
ultimately leads me to recognize the falsity of the initial assumption. But the attempt
to engage people in discussion, in response to what I experience as their speech,
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generally meets with success (and, where frustration, frustration of a different sort).
The bird’s speech we can still recognize as a mark of consciousness, however. Only,
it is not the bird’s consciousness but rather the consciousness of the individual who
originally spoke the words that the bird is now parroting. This example demonstrates
Dharmakīrti’s point that a volition and the actions that result from that volition need
not be co-locational. If I throw a stone, for instance, the flight of the stone is an
intentional act, but one that has its origin in my consciousness. Similarly if someone
pushes me down a flight of stairs, then my movement is the result of an intentional
state—but not my own (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 18). Thus we can see that a person
is taken to be responsible for her actions if the conscious will that gave rise to the
action is her own as well—that is, if she experiences the act subjectively.
The objection is not so easily put to rest, however. R. K. Sharma has argued that,
rather than reinforcing the inference to other minds as Dharmakīrti thinks it does, this
admission actually renders impossible any such inference: “The invariable relation
between consciousness and bodily behaviour now stands eviscerated of all such
subjective conviction on which rested analogical reasoning, with the result that even
the certainty of this relation now comes under question” (Sharma 1985, 59). In order
to infer, by means of an analogy, your intentional state from your actions, I must
already have established that my actions are always accompanied by my mental
states. But if my actions can be the result of another’s will, then the universal
association of my action with my willing does not obtain—and thus there is no
ground for the analogy. Sharma’s challenge, then, is similar to Dharmakīrti’s
challenge regarding the realist’s account of dreams: with pervasion lost, the inference
is undermined.
I noted above that Berkeley has been incorrectly interpreted as providing an
argument by analogy to support the inference to other minds. I suspect Sharma is
similarly misreading Dharmakīrti. To illustrate this, consider the structure of an
argument for the existence of other minds by means of an analogy:
Argument by Analogy:
P7: My actions of a certain type have their cause in my consciousness
P8: These actions are of that certain type
P9: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness
C4: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness
C5: Therefore, consciousnesses other than my own exist
And compare this with Dharmakīrti’s Argument for the existence of other streams of
consciousness, as articulated above:
P4:
P5:
P6:
C2:
C3:

I experience actions of a certain type.
Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness.
These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness.
Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness.
Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist.
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Given the similarity of the final conclusions, as well as the third premise, in the two
arguments, it is understandable how Dharmakīrti could be read as providing an
analogical argument. But from the differences between the first two premises of each
argument, it should be clear that Dharmakīrti is not advocating an analogy.
Dharmakīrti’s causal argument can best be understood, rather, as an argument by
remainder.
What Sharma has provided, I think, is an insightful critique of the possibility of
establishing the existence of other minds by means of an analogy. But as a critique of
Dharmakīrti it misses its mark. Rather than providing a reductio of Dharmakīrti’s
argument, Sharma provides a reductio of his own claim that Dharmakīrti makes use
of an argument by analogy. The argument by analogy relies on an action’s being
similar to mine in order for me to infer a similar cause. But if it can be shown that
there is a difference between my own actions and the actions that form the basis of
the inference, then the analogy will be undermined. The argument by remainder, on
the other hand, relies on a property of actions generally, and applies that property to
the two cases separately. In this way, differences between the two cases under
consideration do not undermine the inference as long as the cases still fall under the
type. Whereas the argument by analogy takes one’s own actions to be the paradigm,
the argument by remainder takes actions generally to be the paradigm, and recognizes
that one’s own actions are merely a type that fall under that general category.
4. CONCLUSION
Dharmakīrti’s argument for knowledge of other streams of consciousness succeeds in
showing the realist’s objections to be incapable of refuting the idealist’s thesis. For
each objection the realist brings to bear, the idealist is able to show that his theory
accounts for experience as well as or better than the realist’s theory. There remains an
objection from another camp, however, that is more difficult to respond to: the fellow
idealist. Ratnakīrti, a successor of Dharmakīrti, argues that the idealist ought to
embrace solipsism. Ratnakīrti accepts Dharmakīrti’s argument from constant colocation in a way the realist cannot bring himself to. But he then proceeds to use this
argument against Dharmakīrti’s inference to other streams of consciousness. Just as
blue and my awareness of blue are non-distinct, so too are your consciousness and my
awareness of your consciousness. The idea of your mental states existing independent
of my awareness of those mental states is unthinkable by me, in precisely the way that
Berkeley points out that it is impossible to think of an object unthought-of. Within my
experience there is no difference between your feeling, say, angry, and my
representing to myself that you are angry. This being the case, what possible meaning
can asserting knowledge of other streams of consciousness have for me, beyond being
an assertion about my own consciousness—and thus not about other streams of
consciousness after all?
This seems to me an exceedingly difficult challenge for Dharmakīrti to respond
to. One possibility is that he could abandon his own argument for idealism, and make
use instead of Vasubandhu’s and Dignāga’s arguments (though these are not without
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their own detractors). As Arindam Chakrabarti (1990) points out, there exist a number
of sophisticated responses to the argument from constant co-location.
A less unpalatable response for Dharmakīrti may be to claim that the inference to
other streams of consciousness provides content for the assertion that not all of my
states of awareness are up to me. This may reduce ultimately to an assertion about my
own mental states, but it is a different sort of assertion about my mental states—that
they have their cause in something outside me, something that is beyond the grasp of
perceptual awareness, and only indirectly within the grasp of inferential awareness. I
take this approach to be the most promising way not just for Dharmakīrti, but for
idealists more generally to respond to Ratnakīrti’s objection. This is important
because, while the objection itself may originate in medieval India, it is relevant to
anyone who wants to advocate idealism, regardless of temporal or geographic
circumstance.
There is a caveat attached to this move, however: it brings one dangerously close
to Berkeley’s position of inferring a qualitatively different sort of mind, the position
that led him to the consequence that Dharmakīrti’s idealism has heretofore been able
to avoid. But if the idealist remains faithful to Dharmakīrti’s causal account of
experience and of intersubjective agreement, and does not concern herself overmuch
with the nature of the mental cause that is just beyond one’s grasp, she may be able to
avoid the untoward consequence.
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BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENT NOW
HOWARD J. CURZER

ABSTRACT: Mencian benevolent government intervenes dramatically in many ways in the
marketplace in order to secure the material well-being of the population, especially the poor
and disadvantaged. Mencius considers this sort of intervention to be appropriate not just
occasionally when dealing with natural disasters, but regularly. Furthermore, Mencius
recommends shifting from regressive to progressive taxes. He favors reduction of inequality
so as to reduce corruption of government by the wealthy, and opposes punishment for people
driven to crime by destitution. Mencius thinks government should try to improve the
character of the population by preventing or relieving poverty, by setting a good example,
and by teaching people to respect and care for each other. He considers a government to be
legitimate only if it has the support of the people. His recommended foreign policy is
approximately the same as his recommended domestic policy: set a good example and
enhance the material wellbeing and moral values of one’s own people so that they will
enthusiastically support their country, while foreigners will long to immigrate. These are
policies of today’s left. Mencius was a radical reformer in his own day. His description of
benevolent government shows that he is an extreme liberal by contemporary standards, too.
Keywords: Mencius, benevolent government, liberal, conservative, regulation, taxation,
punishment, legitimacy, civil liberties, foreign policy

1. INTRODUCTION
Its emphasis on ritual, filial piety, tradition, hierarchy, etc. raises the specter that the
Confucian tradition is inherently politically conservative.1 I shall try to assuage this
worry, but rather than struggling to encompass the entire Confucian tradition within
the bounds of a single paper, I shall focus on Mencius’ description of benevolent
government for the Warring States period. In this paper, I shall describe the policies
and underlying principles of benevolent government in order to compare them with
some of the policies and principles currently debated by American liberals and
________________________
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Long (2003, 35-62) argues that the Confucian tradition is predominately libertarian.
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conservatives. Some ideas which are progressive when first proposed are left behind
by the march of history and sound quite reactionary, today. Not Mencius’ ideas!
Mencius was a radical political reformer in his own day, and perhaps surprisingly, he
also turns out to be a liberal – even a radical – by the standards of the contemporary
political scene.
Three procedural points: First, contemporary comparisons between Mencian and
modern political thought are not lacking, but with few exceptions they have been
limited to the ongoing debate about whether human rights are compatible with the
Confucian tradition.2 Without denying the importance of that debate, I shall frame my
discussion in terms of governmental duties. This will have the advantage of being less
anachronistic since Mencius, himself, talks of what a ruler should do rather than what
people deserve. Discussing duties may better enable us to listen for insight from
Mencius rather than arguing about whether Mencian benevolent government meets
our standards. Second, I shall extrapolate from the concrete practices Mencius
prescribes to the general responsibilities of government which I take to underlie these
practices. Although anachronism and misinterpretation are serious risks, such
extrapolation is necessary in order to bring Mencius into the contemporary dialog
since many of the particular practices he describes are inapplicable to the modern
world. Third, in order to keep the focus on Mencius rather than on the details of
contemporary politics (and in order to keep this paper to a reasonable length), I shall
have to compare Mencian benevolent government to rough caricatures rather than
nuanced characterizations of contemporary liberals and conservatives. I ask the
reader’s indulgence for this oversimplification.
2. REGULATION AND INTERVENTION
The Mencius begins with an account of a crucial component of benevolent
government. When King Hui takes famine to be a natural disaster to which he
responds well, Mencius retorts that famine is a result of a natural disaster (e.g.
drought) plus inadequate preparations. He faults the king for merely responding to,
rather than forestalling famine (1A3.1-2). The general principle here is that
governments should strive to anticipate natural disasters and take steps to avert them.
This principle is currently uncontroversial with respect to disasters such as fires and
floods, but contested with respect to disasters such as stock market crashes and oil
spills. Contemporary conservatives tend to blame crashes and spills on market forces
and rock strata. They take crashes and spills to be natural disasters. By contrast,
contemporary liberals along with Mencius maintain that crashes and spills are the
results of market forces, rock strata, plus inadequate governmental preparation and
regulation.3 Liberals might take a cue from Mencius. They might supplement their
2

Exceptions include Bai (2008, 19-34), Bell (2006, 231-254), and Chan (2003, 236-253). For a sample
of the human rights debate see De Bary and Weiming (1998), Bauer and Bell (1999), and Angle and
Svensson (2001).
3
This dispute is perhaps even more pronounced with respect to problems which are not extreme or
sudden enough to qualify as disasters. Conservatives tend to blame nature completely for these
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case for more preparation and regulation by citing Mencius’ warning that people tend
to blame nature for their problems rather than accept the social responsibility to take
preventative measures. That is, liberals might use this Mencian nugget of insight
about a common blame-shifting mechanism in their debate with conservatives over
this issue.
A second issue at the heart of disputes between liberals and conservatives has to
do with ways in which other people or institutions might interfere with people’s
livelihoods. Mencius also has considered view on this issue. For example, a bit later
in Mencius’ retort to King Hui, Mencius cautions against governmental policies that
disrupt people’s lives and livelihoods (1A3.3).4 Both liberals and conservatives are
excruciatingly aware of governments’ potential to impose excessive burdens. All
acknowledge, in principle, that governments should avoid such intrusions, even if
governments are not always successful at avoiding them in practice. Unlike
conservatives, however, liberals think that governments are not the only serious threat
to people’s lives and livelihoods. Liberals also worry about concentrations of private
power which enable individuals, corporations, and organizations to restrict and/or
exploit others. Liberals believe that an important role of government is to act as a
bulwark against such restriction and/or exploitation, even though this protection
typically requires governmental restrictions on the freedom of powerful people and
groups. As I shall show below, Mencius shares with liberals this worry about
threatening concentrations of private power, and his solution also requires
governmental curbs on the liberties of the powerful.
Like Confucius, Mencius often moves from one injunction to another which pulls
in almost the opposite direction like a sailboat tacking against the wind. In 1A3 he
follows his injunction to avoid certain government interventions by tacking in the
opposite direction with an injunction to perform governmental interventions of a
different sort – in this case by enjoining the king to prohibit extra-fine fishing nets
and off-season logging (1A3.3). Mencius’ rationale for this prohibition is that if only
a few people fish or log excessively, they will gain extra food and fuel, and the
overall harm to society will be minimal. Problems arise only when such practices
become widespread. Thus, the general principle here is that governments should
restrict people’s choices in order to prevent a tragedy of the commons. The ongoing
struggle over pollution prohibitions shows how controversial this principle is today.
Partially because of their faith in the invisible hand, contemporary conservatives balk
at the idea that governments should restrict individual freedoms by prohibiting
individually profitable acts. As a rhetorical tool, the invisible hand exercises a
powerful fascination. Liberals could use some help in breaking its hypnotic hold on
people, so they should welcome Mencius’ observation that the invisible hand is not

problematic non-disasters, while liberals maintain that it is government’s responsibility to prepare for,
and respond to these problems. For example, conservatives take terrible traffic problems to be a fact of
life while liberals take them to result from a governmental choice to subsidize oil drilling rather than
mass transit.
4
Citations are to Mencius (2008) unless otherwise specified.
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ubiquitous. Although many self-interested choices sometimes produce efficiency, at
other times they produce disaster.
Governments must do more than merely refrain from burdensome demands,
prepare for disasters, and prevent tragedies of the commons.5 According to Mencius,
governments must also ensure that crucial tasks get done right. Mencius endorses
customs inspections of roads and markets (1B5.3) and the repair of bridges (4B2).
More strikingly, Mencius says that governments should regulate and supervise
plowing, planting, weeding, reaping, and animal husbandry – every important aspect
of farming (1A3.4, 1A5.3, 1A7.21, 1B4.5, 6B7.2). Governments should do this not
just occasionally to recoup from disasters, but regularly to increase efficiency. Now
farming in the Warring States period was the occupation of the overwhelming
majority of the population. Thus, Mencius is not just saying that government must
regulate a few aspects of a small, but important sector of the economy; he is saying
that government should regulate, in great detail, all aspects of the work of almost
everyone. Mencian benevolent government, therefore, is very far from laissez faire
government. Presumably, Mencius advocates this drastic policy because he believes
that people will not follow expert advice unless required to do so. Current examples
of comprehensive regulation and production incentives are numerous, of course, but
nowhere near as invasive as Mencius’ proposal. Imagine what today’s farmers would
say if required by the government to plant on certain days, plough in certain ways,
etc. On this issue, Mencius seems even further left than contemporary liberals.
3. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
An ideally just policy would convict all and only the guilty. In the real world, liberals
opt to err on the side of acquitting some of the guilty in order to minimize convictions
of the innocent while conservatives conversely tend to minimize acquittals of the
guilty at the cost of convicting some of the innocent. That is, liberals tend to favor
various due-process policies while conservatives conversely tend to favor law-andorder policies. Again Mencius takes a liberal view, although this can be obscured by
anachronistic expectations (2A2.24). Mencius says that an accused person should be
executed only if he or she is judged guilty both by the ruler and by all of the
(sophisticated) people (1B7.5). Extrapolating, I suggest that Mencian benevolent
government would inflict any severe punishment only if the ruler’s representatives
(the prosecutors) and the people’s representatives (the jury) unanimously agree. This
procedure is uncontroversial in the contemporary world, of course. But Mencius is
advocating a dramatic modification to the autocratic, harsh procedures of his day.
Studies show that the crime rate generally rises when jobs are scarce and wages
are low,6 suggesting that some people turn to crime when they cannot find adequate
5

Passage 1A3.3 suggests that governments need do no more than this, but it will become clear that
Mencius thinks that considerably more governmental action will be necessary.
6
Unsurprisingly, this pattern is especially pronounced with respect to property crimes. The statistics
are tricky, for this pattern is sometimes masked by other factors.
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honest work.7 Conservatives claim that people are not forced to become criminals by
poverty in capitalist countries, for the free market ensures that opportunities to find
honest work are available. Governments need only refrain from interference with the
free market. By contrast, liberals believe that governments have obligations to
provide a sufficient safety net for the truly needy by providing welfare, food stamps,
unemployment compensation, etc. Insofar as governments allow people to become
impoverished, liberals are sympathetic to criminals. They tend to blame and punish
criminals less than conservatives because they see governments as partially to blame.
Again, Mencius is considerably further left than contemporary liberals. Mencius
believes not only that destitute people tend to turn to crime, but also and quite
remarkably, that when they perform criminal acts, they should not be punished
(1A7.20, 3A3.3, 6A7.1). Presumably, the reason is that governments, and not the
people, themselves, are responsible for preventing destitution (6B7.2).
4. NECESSITIES AND LUXURIES
Mencius claims that the government must provide aid to people directly whenever the
people become impoverished. He requires rulers and lesser lords to “distribute grain
to those who do not have enough” (1B4.5-10, 6B7.2, 3B9.9). Of course, the
government must obtain the grain from those who have more than enough in the first
place. One might at first take Mencius to be insisting merely that governments take
precautions to ameliorate a disaster’s impact by spreading the burden widely rather
than allowing it to be wholly born by only a few. He is at least advocating a
requirement that everyone participate in a public plan for insurance against starvation.
The current dispute over a public plan for healthcare shows how controversial such a
requirement is in contemporary America. Liberals generally favor such approaches,
conservatives generally oppose them, thinking that insurance should be optional and
provided by private companies, instead.
But Mencius is actually making an even more controversial claim. He does not
say merely that governments should collect grain in years of plenty, and distribute it
in lean years. He is not talking only about spreading the burden of disaster relief; he is
also endorsing an ongoing redistributive scheme, a welfare system. He thinks that it
would be best if people care for each other voluntarily, but if needy people are not
cared for by their relatives and/or friends, then government should be the caregiver of
last resort. It should ensure that everyone is cared for (Chan 2003, 236-242).
It might seem controversial to suggest that Mencius think that everyone should be
cared for, so let me elaborate. Mencius mentions no benefit-qualification requirement
other than need. In particular, he does not exclude those who “do not have enough”
because they are inept or lazy farmers, as contemporary conservatives would prefer.
Parallel to their view on punishment, contemporary liberals opt to err on the side of
supporting some free-riders in order to minimize unsupported truly needy people,
while conservatives conversely choose to minimize support for free-riders at the cost
7

For example see Chiricos (1987, 187-212) and Weinberg and Mustard (2002, 45-61).
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of also depriving some of the truly needy. Mencius takes this to the extreme; he
makes no noticeable effort to preclude free-riders at all. Thus, Mencius takes a very
liberal stance with respect to distributive, as well as retributive justice. Perhaps
Mencius is unaware of the free rider problem, but it seems more likely that he just
considers precluding free-riders to be a lower priority than ensuring that help reaches
the truly needy.
So far, benevolent government consists in ensuring that the economy runs well
and that no one is pushed to the wall or punished when they are so pushed. But
Mencius also advocates public musical performances, parks, etc. in order to give the
people access to these luxuries (1B1, 1B2, 1B4).8 Of course it is liberals rather than
conservatives who tend to favor public support for the arts, parks, and other luxuries.
Mencius goes further. He tells King Hui to take steps to enable fifty-year-olds to wear
silk and seventy-year-olds to eat meat (1A3.4, 7A22). In the Warring States period,
these were luxuries. So in this passage, Mencius is deploying the liberal principle that
government should not only to ensure that people’s basic needs are satisfied, and that
they have access to certain publicly supported luxuries, but also that each person has
his or her own luxuries.9 Of course, both liberals and conservatives are committed to
the idea that people should have the right to “the pursuit of happiness.” But
conservatives interpret this right narrowly to mean that people’s attempts to increase
their happiness should not be interfered with, except insofar as is necessary to protect
the rights of others, while liberals interpret the right broadly to mean that people’s
attempts to increase their happiness should be supplemented by governmental
provision of sufficient opportunities. Yet again, Mencius is further to the left than
contemporary liberals. He asserts that governments should ensure not just the
opportunity to acquire luxuries, but even the luxuries, themselves.
The Mencian safety net is not the same for all. Mencius demands special
provisions for those with special needs. To begin with, Mencius says that if the
government does its job, “those whose hair has turned gray will not carry loads on the
roadways” (1A3.4). That is, Mencius maintains that government is responsible for
ensuring that the elderly are able to retire, or at least to avoid heavy labor. This is a
sort of social security, a favorite program of contemporary liberals, but not of
conservatives.
Moreover, Mencian benevolent government ensures that people have the means to
support their living family members and bury their dead ones according to ritual
propriety (1A3.3). At first it might seem that Mencius and contemporary
conservatives are on the same wavelength here, for both want support and burials to
be performed by kinfolk rather than by the government. But the crucial difference
comes when people lack kin to support or bury them, or when their kin lack sufficient
8

This is a controversial interpretation of these passages. Mencius may merely be saying that rulers
may enjoy these luxuries so long as they ensure that their people have access to other luxuries.
9
Mencius may be making a similar point when he tells King Xuan to treat the commoners as if they
had a “weakness for wealth” (1B5.4). Alternatively, rather than saying that the people should be given
luxuries, Mencius may be reiterating his thesis that government should provide a safety net for the
impoverished.
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resources. In such cases, conservatives are content to leave the matter in private
hands; they are willing to wait for some charitable person, church, or NGO to step up
to fill the need. By contrast, Mencius considers it to be the responsibility of
government to ensure that people are supported and buried. One of Mencius’ heroes,
King Wen, gave special consideration to four sorts of people: widowers, widows,
childless folks, and orphans (1B5.3). Presumably, Mencius thinks that other rulers
should do the same, and presumably, the reason is that these are folks with no kin to
support or bury them. Thus, if there are no kin, then government should step in.
Moreover, if there are kin, but they cannot fulfill their ritual obligations to their
family members, it is government that has failed them. Mencius sides with liberals
and against conservatives by endorsing the principle that government should enable
people to fulfill their obligations to their relatives. A contemporary application of this
principle is that needy parents should receive enough welfare and food stamp
payments to enable them to support their children.
5. TAXATION
How, according to Mencius, is this significant expansion of government to be paid
for? Clearly not by increasing the taxes of the common folks. Indeed, Mencian
benevolent government involves lowering their taxes (1A5.3). Mencius discusses
specific taxes on two groups: merchants and farmers. He proposes the elimination of
taxes on merchants’ goods, shops, travel, and persons (2A5.2-3, 2A5.5).10
Functionally, a tax on goods is a sales tax, for it is passed on directly to the consumer.
The other three are equal for poor and rich merchants. Thus, all of these are
regressive taxes. Mencius replaces them with a straightforward 10% income tax
(3A3.15).11 Again, Mencius sides with contemporary liberals. Liberals are generally
in favor of progressive or at least proportional taxes rather than regressive taxes,
while conservatives generally wish to lower income taxes and raise alternative taxes
such as sales taxes which are regressive.
For the farmers, Mencius recommends the “well-field system.” Under that system
each household owns a field of a certain size, and in addition contributes 1/8 of the
labor necessary to farm a common field of the same size whose proceeds go to the
government (1B5.3, 3A3.15). Thus, each farming household gets to keep the proceeds
of 8/9 of its labor, and the proceeds of the remaining 1/9 go to the government. If
everyone were to pull exactly his or her own weight, each household would be taxed

10

Mencius does believe in taxing merchants when they are not selling goods at a fair price (2B10.7).
In this passage, Mencius distinguishes between those living in the countryside and those in the
middle of the state. The former are clearly farmers, and Mencius suggests that they be taxed by “the
one-ninth assistance method” which is the well-field system. I think that by contrast the latter must be
merchants, and Mencius suggests that they be taxed by “the one-tenth method, making them pay taxes
individually.”
11
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at the rate of about 11%.12 Functionally however, the well-field system would work a
bit differently. I suggest that Mencius favors it because it provides an opportunity for
extending benevolence from the family to the neighbors. Generally, the able will feel
pressure to contribute more to farming the common field; the less able will be
allowed to contribute less. Thus, the well-field system incentivizes benevolence, not
by offering tax relief for charitable donations, as contemporary conservatives prefer,
but rather by peer pressure on the well-off to contribute more than their 11% to the
government so that the disadvantaged may contribute less than their 11%.
Mencius says that, “benevolent government must begin with setting the field
boundaries.” Mencius explains that corrupt officials are lax about this because, “If the
field boundaries are not straightly set, the well-fields will not be equal, and the grain
income will not be even” (3A3.13). Why are corrupt officials indifferent or partial to
uneven grain income? Presumably, because those farmers with greater incomes bribe
officials to close their eyes to the inequality. Here Mencius is delicately hinting at two
morals: inequality is to be avoided, and inequality tends to perpetuate itself or
increase because the advantaged are in a position to preserve or increase their
advantages. Mencius urges officials to straighten the field boundaries. In other words,
he advocates redistribution by taking land from those who have more and giving to
those who have less until the land holdings are equalized. Contemporary liberals
would not go so far, but they would like to limit inequality, so as to keep the gap
between rich and poor from becoming a chasm. Furthermore, it is liberals who fear
that concentrations of private power will perpetuate or enhance themselves by
corrupting government.
6. LEGITIMACY
Mencian benevolent government seems undemocratic. After all, Mencius only
discusses monarchies, and he observes that a king may be overthrown only when he
has lost the mandate of heaven (1B8, 5A5.1-2), and only by relatives (5B9).13 So far
this sounds like the divine right of kings, but Mencius also says that rulers who
govern improperly should be sacked (1B6). Moreover, it turns out that the mandate of
heaven is manifested partially by the people’s acceptance of the king (5A5.5-6). Now
Mencius is not talking about a majority vote on the king’s tenure. Rather his view is
that as long as most of the people are not upset enough to revolt, a properly installed
king retains heaven’s mandate. Even if the overwhelming majority would prefer
another ruler, the king retains the mandate so long as the people’s preference for an
alternative is mild or moderate. This is admittedly far from democratic, although it
does show that the people’s preferences are relevant.

12

I doubt that Mencius is intentionally advocating a higher tax rate for farmers than for merchants.
Rather Mencius seems to be thinking in approximate terms. He takes the well-field system to generate
about a 10% tax rate (3B8).
13
Rather than a theoretical limitation, I take Mencius’ claim that only relatives may depose a king to
be a practical concession; non-relatives shouldn’t try because only relatives can get away with it.
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The king is one man; almost all governing is done by others. The legitimacy
conditions for the king are not the legitimacy conditions for the government as a
whole. Retaining the mandate of heaven is not the standard of job security for anyone
in government except the ultimate ruler. Everyone in government other than the king
must meet a different and higher standard. Mencius says that subordinates should be
hired for their worthiness and removed by their superiors for absenteeism, negligence,
selfishness, or incompetence (1B6.2, 1B8, 6B7.2). Defending against Mencius’
accusation that he hires and fires public officials at whim, King Xuan asks how the
competence of a person may be determined. Mencius replies that office holders must
meet two conditions; they must be recommended by all of the people and pass a royal
examination in order to gain, and to retain office (1B7). Neither the ruler nor the
people has complete authority to hire or fire.
Mencius’ view of the royal role in hiring might be that the king (or his agents)
should interview candidates and/or perform background checks. Presumably, the king
should make retention decisions on the basis of “inspection tours” and the “reports on
responsibilities” made by subordinates to superiors (1B4.5, 6B7.2). Mencius does not
specify a method by which the people might endorse a candidate for office; in
particular, he does not specify elections. But he clearly thinks that office holders must
have and hold the favor of a large majority of the people.14 Thus, Mencian benevolent
government is not so different than our own when it comes to determining who
should govern. In both cases, a small group of high officials (king, Supreme Court)
are insulated from politics by the fact that they are removable only when extremely
unpopular, but everyone else in government must gain and retain the endorsement of
both the higher-ups in their party and the favor of the majority of the people. Of
course, Mencius does not think that everyone is qualified to make policy decisions
(3A4.6), but neither do we in the modern world. Rather both we and Mencius think
that those who lack the ability to govern should nevertheless have some significant
say in choosing officeholders.
7. CIVIL LIBERTIES
Mencian benevolent government seems to be at its most conservative when it comes
to non-economic liberties and social policy. After all, Mencius rejects liberal
neutrality; he hopes to use the power of government to convert the populace to a
certain way of life. In particular, he advocates a family-centered, traditional,
hierarchical set of values. In both means and ends, Mencian benevolent government
seems closer to contemporary conservatives than to liberals.
Yet this turns out to be an illusion. First, liberals are not committed to the idea
that the state should be completely neutral. Rather they believe that the state should
favor at least the values which are necessary conditions for the possibility of liberal
14

Tiwald distinguishes between two general sorts of popular endorsement: (a) the people’s judgments
about an official’s virtue and qualifications, and (b) their love, loyalty, and political participation under
an official. Functionally, these may not be distinct (Tiwald 2008, 277-280).
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neutrality. Now the values Mencius hopes to promulgate are pretty general and
minimal: “the righteousness of filiality and brotherliness” (1A3.4, 1A7.24). Arguably,
these are not values peculiar to just a few particular conceptions of the good, but
rather they are necessary bits of a framework which makes it possible for numerous
different conceptions of the good to be pursued. That is, they are values that even
liberals would consider necessary to inculcate because they make liberal neutrality
possible. Rawls, for example, maintains that some of the character traits necessary for
the development of the sense of justice are rooted in early filiality (Rawls 1971, 462467; see also Galston 1991, 283-287).
Second, the means Mencius endorses are more liberal than conservative.
Mencius’ approach is not to legislate morality, as conservatives favor. He takes
regulation of behavior to be less effective than teaching which is less effective than
modeling good behavior (7A14). Mencius believes that people are inherently good in
the sense that their sprouts will develop into virtues so long as basic resources are
present and repeated interference is absent (6A8). Thus, rather than urging rulers to
ban various practices, Mencius urges rulers to remove restrictions on behavior that
might interfere with moral development (1A3.3, 1B2).
Admittedly, Mencius takes education to be important, and he does endorse trying
to change people’s behavior through teaching in the schools (1A3.4, 1A7.24, 3A4.8).
He does not specify a pedagogical strategy, but if he follows Confucius’ lead,
Mencian teaching would consist of explanation and discussion rather than
indoctrination (Analects 2.15).
To summarize, Mencius thinks that government should let people develop
naturally with only minimal guidance and limitations. Rather than prohibiting some
behaviors, requiring others, and inculcating values by manipulation and/or appeals to
authority, benevolent government’s main strategies for improving people’s values and
behavior are to protect people from hardships and interference which would hinder
moral development, and to win the people over to virtue by example and reasoned
persuasion (4B5, 7A14). Rather than forcing and indoctrinating people, rulers should
focus on protecting people from destitution and modeling the right behavior. Overall,
benevolent government is not completely neutral, but the values it endorses are
arguably socially necessary, and it does not try to impose its values by illiberal
means.
8. FOREIGN POLICY
Liberals tend to seek lower defense budgets and higher social spending than
conservatives. They do not hold the Pollyannaish view that if government can get its
domestic policy right, then foreign policy will take care of itself. They allow for wars
in cases of defense, narrowly defined, and for wars of liberation to free people from
oppressive regimes, although not for wars of conquest or to gain resources. But they
do think that economic policy is an important component of national defense. What
keeps a state strong is not just its military-industrial complex, but also its social
capital, even if the education and well-being of its people cannot be seen to help in
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any direct way. Conservatives tend toward the opposite priorities and policies. They
think that reducing the defense budget weakens the country, and increasing social
spending does not strengthen it. Mencius too allows for wars of defense and liberation
(1B10), but not wars of conquest (2B8.2). But once more Mencius is further to the
left than contemporary liberals. His main strategy for protecting a state is to avoid
cruelty and enhance the well-being, and thus the loyalty of that state’s citizenry
through the penal and economic policies describe above. This will win the hearts and
minds of the state’s own people, making them a formidable force for defense and
offense (1A5.3-6, 2B1, 4A9). Moreover, this policy will also win the hearts and
minds of the people of neighboring states, making them a resource rather than a
threat. If one practices benevolent government, “the people of neighboring states will
welcome you like a father or mother….One will have no enemies in the world”
(2A5.6, 3B5.4). Conversely, illiberal penal and economic policy will lose hearts and
minds both at home and abroad (1B11, 6B6.4).
Liberals maintain that setting a morally good example is an important aspect of
foreign policy. One reason to adopt principled domestic and foreign policies is to
deprive other governments of justifications for injustice and oppression. A more
positive reason is to give other peoples and governments an actual, rather than ideal
model at which to aim. Like liberals, Mencius endorses transforming other
governments by example (2A3). Along with advocating a benevolent domestic
policy, he opposes compromising with oppressive regimes in order to secure
advantages to one’s own state (4A7, 4A14.3).
9. CONCLUSION
I have not tried to address the actual or potential role of human rights within the
whole Confucian tradition. Instead, I have focused on the particular doctrines that
constitute Mencian benevolent government. This investigation has shown that
Mencius consistently advocates liberal, sometime radical policies and principles. The
fact that Mencius is a leftist is one resource that Confucians can use to combat the
worry that the Confucian tradition is inherently conservative. And while appealing to
the authority of Mencius will not help today’s embattled liberals in the West (as
appealing to the authority of Jesus seems to help conservatives), liberals can use some
Mencian insights and arguments in their struggle for popular opinion.
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